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The aim of this thesis is to investigate cartels and the impact of competition policy from
various angles.
Chapter 1, joint with Joan-Ramon Borrell, José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro and Juan Luis
Jiménez, analyzes the relationship between cartel life cycles and business cycles. We analyze
the relationship between cartel startups/breakups and economic cycles using a dataset of cartels
sanctioned by the European Commission. Results show that cartels are more likely to be formed
when the business has evolved positively in the previous months and managers expect prices to
decline, but that cartels also tend to breakup when the business has evolved positively. Upturns
in firm-specific business cycles appear to cause cartel turnovers: existing cartels die while new
ones are set up.
Chapter 2 aims at obtaining a precise measure of how much firms benefit from collusion. I
evaluate the causal effect of being a cartel member on the revenues and profits of cartelized firms,
using comparable non-collusive firms as control group. A dataset of discovered cartel cases in
Spain from 1990 to 2014 and an alternative dataset of firms’ balance sheets are used. Results
show that firms increase their revenues, on average, between 19% and 26% due to the collusive
agreement, while no significant effect is found on profits. Estimations by cartel duration demon-
strate that the members of long-lasting cartels not only increase their revenues (29%−50%), but
also their profits more than two times. Further analysis shows that cartels that are profitable
from the beginning tend to last longer and do not apply for Leniency Programs.
Chapter 3, joint with Joan-Ramon Borrell, Juan Luis Jiménez and José Manuel Ordóñez-
de-Haro, investigates how Leniency Programs destabilize cartels. We study the effect of the
Leniency Program on cartel duration, cartel fines and on the years of investigation using a
difference-in-differences program evaluation approach. Cartel cases discovered by the European
Commission and the Spanish Competition Authority are analyzed. Results show a short-run
effect of the Leniency Program: the detected cartels have longer duration than the ones in the
control group. In the long-run, the program decreases cartel duration. On the other hand, no
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Chapter 1
When are cartels more likely to be formed or broken? The
role of business cycles
(joint with Borrell, J.R.1, Ordóñez-de-Haro, J.M.2 and Jiménez, J.L.3 )
Abstract
The literature presents mixed contributions about the economic conditions under which car-
tels form and collapse, and about how stable they are across firm-specific and industry-wide
business cycles. The relationship between cartel life cycles and business cycles has not been
sufficiently analyzed to date. In this paper, we study in depth whether collusion is pro-cyclical
or counter-cyclical. We analyze the relationship between cartel startups/breakups and economic
cycles using a dataset of sanctioned cartels by the European Commission that were active be-
tween 1997 and 2012, after the leniency program had already been introduced. We also double
check whether this relationship has changed with respect to the pre-leniency period from 1991 to
1996. Our results show that cartels are more likely to be formed when the business has evolved
positively in the previous months and managers expect prices to decline, but that cartels also
tend to breakup also when the business has evolved positively. Upturns in firm-specific business
cycles appear to cause cartel turnovers: existing cartels die while new ones are set up.
Keywords: Cartels; Business Cycles; Business Expectations, Antitrust.
JEL Codes: D7; K2; L4; O4.
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1.1 Introduction
In the last decades, the tools at the disposal of Antitrust Authorities in the fight against
cartels have improved considerably, being the leniency program the cornerstone of the most
important instruments. Although some improvements have been made, the fact that cartels
are illegal makes them highly secretive, which complicates the task of proving their existence.
Therefore, it would be useful to have some collusive markers or some screening instruments to
monitor some markets with environments conductive to collusion.
In this paper we focus both on cartel formation and breakups4, and how these two events
relate to firm-specific business cycles, price expectations, and industry-wide cycles. We study
how both the number of cartels formed or collapsing is determined not only by the demand or
production faced by the firm recently and industry economic situation, but also by the expecta-
tions that firms’ managers have.
There are two seminal papers that linked business cycles and cartel stability: Rotemberg
and Saloner (1986) and Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991). However, the former shows that
collusion is counter-cyclical while the latter that it is pro-cyclical. All in all, collusion may be
one or the other depending on the modeling details that prevail on the data.
Several papers have also tried to offer insights on this question5 (Bagwell and Staiger, 1997;
Fabra, 2006; Levenstein and Suslow, 2011 & 2016; or Antonielli and Mariniello, 2014). Moreover,
there are meta-analyses of case studies of cartel cases formed before the 1950’s (Levenstein and
Suslow, 2006); or other papers relate the percentage of months in the sample in which an eco-
nomic downturn took place and the percentage of cartels formed in that period (Suslow, 2005).
However, the question of whether collusion is pro-cyclical or contra-cyclical is however unsettled.
To address the question of interest we work with the number of cartels formed and with the
number of cartels broken due to internal reasons in the European Union every month, mostly
after the introduction of the leniency program (1997-2012), but also during the pre-leniency
period, ranging from 1991 to 1996. By estimating a Poisson regression model, we analyze which
is the effect of the sector real production (industry growth or decline), of the business evolution
perceptions in the last months (firm perceived dynamics) and the managers’ price expectations
on the likelihood of setting-up or breaking-apart of any cartel.
The contributions of this paper are several. First, we study cartel formation itself, using a
4We are aware of the fact that working with discovered cartels is a limitation of the data. Several papers
in the literature have looked at what may the discovered cartels tell us about the underlying cartel population
(Harrington and Wei, 2017; Harrington and Chang, 2009). Our results are only applicable to discovered cartels.
5For a revision of this literature, see Levenstein and Suslow (2014).
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EU database, which has not been broadly studied from an empirical point of view so far. Second,
we make use of business surveys to analyze cartel formation and breakups, a link that has not
been used in the literature for this purpose despite the information it provides regarding business
managers’ point of view. Finally, we do not only analyze the relationship between cartels and
business cycles, but we do also analyze the effect of price expectations on cartel formation and
breakup.
Our results show that cartels are more likely to be formed in firms’ upturns, but also that
cartels tend to breakup also in firms’ upturns. Cartels are more prone to be created when
managers consider that their firm production has evolved positively in the last three months
(growing firms) and when they expect a decrease in prices in the near future (with expected
declining prices). Cartels are more likely to collapse also when managers consider that their firm
production has evolved positively in the last three months. Upturns in firm-specific business
cycles and downturns in economic cycles appear to cause cartel turnovers: existing cartels die
while new ones are set up. However, the effect of business evolution on cartel breakup is lower
when the industry real production is high.
This paper is structured as follows. After this brief introduction, the second section contains
a review of the literature. The data is described and discussed in section 3. Section 4 details
the empirical strategy, before analyzing the results in section 5. Section 6 offers a wide set of
robustness checks. Finally, the main conclusions of this work are discussed in section 7.
1.2 Literature Review
The literature that relates business cycle and cartels focuses mostly on the stability of car-
tels instead of cartel startups or breakups. It has been studied the effect of business cycle on
cartel duration and collusive pricing from a theoretical and empirical point of view, although
conclusions are contradictory.
The classic cartel dilemma was established by Stigler (1964) and developed by Tirole (1988).
It analyzes if collusion can be sustained if the expected profit from colluding today outweighs
the expected profit of defecting from a cooperative agreement (see Levenstein and Suslow, 2016,
for further explanation). In this model, the impatience of any firm owners, so the firm-specific
risk premium is a cornerstone of the cartel stability.
From the theoretical point of view, the model proposed by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) is
a pioneering work linking business cycles and cartel life cycles. Their model looks at collusion
and business cycles, defined as a boom or recession of demand, but assumes that the level of
3
demand is determined each period from an independent and identically distributed process. So,
in their setup, booms and busts occur from time to time with some known probability, but it
cannot be predicted when they finally happen.
The authors investigate the effect of such business cycles of booms and busts on optimal
collusive pricing. They conclude that for moderate values of the discount factor (mature indus-
tries, or at least not too risky industries or activities), collusion is countercyclical: cartels are
more likely to break up in demand booms as deviation today from collusive price is less costly in
terms of foregone profits in the future, and also the gain of deviating from a collusive agreement
is greatest during booms. Additionally, collusive price is countercyclical: firms also tend to price
competitively in demand downturns.
By contrast, Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) present a model that allows for both the
level of current demand and firms’ expectations on future demand to change over time. Those
authors conclude that while the gain of deviating from a collusive agreement is greatest during
booms, firms find it even more difficult to collude during recessions, as the forgone profits from
inducing a price war are relatively low. Therefore, collusion is pro-cyclical, more difficult in
busts, easier in booms.
These two seminal contributions differ with respect the dynamics of the business cycle, ob-
taining completely contradictory results: when booms and bust come from i.i.d processes, col-
lusion is countercyclical; but, when business expansions and downturns have some correlation
over time, collusion is pro-cyclical.
Bagwell and Staiger (1997) extend the model of collusive pricing assuming that demand
movements are stochastic and persistent. A Markov process determines the transition between
slow-growth and fast-growth states. In this case, they show that collusive prices are weakly
pro-cyclical when demand growth rates are positively correlated through time.
The authors note that the empirical evidence is mixed since there is both pro-cyclical and
countercyclical pricing (see, among others, Bils, 1987a; Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen, 1986a,
1986b, 1987; and Rotemberg and Saloner 1986).
Extending the Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) model by introducing capacity constraints,
Fabra (2006) shows that when capacity constraints6 are sufficiently tight, firms find it more
difficult to collude during booms, whereas the contrary is true for larger capacity values.
6Athey and Bagwell (2001) study a model of collusion in which firms receive an iid cost shock, and Athey and
Bagwell (2008) analyze a model of collusion in which the cost shock is persistent. However, business cycles are
not considered.
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From an empirical point of view, Hyytinen, Steen and Toivanen (2011) use a hidden Markov
model, which consists of a hidden process (the industry cartel dynamics in this case, since there
may be industries never investigated or convicted) and an observation process that reveals in-
formation on the state of the hidden process for some periods (what the researcher knows about
the state of the industry in a given period). They find that the chance of forming a cartel is
around 20%, increases over their sample period and responds to positive shocks to GDP being
then pro-cyclical.
Suslow (2005) uses an empirical model to test for the importance of demand uncertainty and
cartel organizational characteristics in determining cartel duration. She finds out that economic
uncertainty, measured as the fluctuation of an industrial production index, accounts for most
of the variance in the duration of the cartel agreements. Also Levenstein and Suslow (2011)
analyze the impact of cartel organizational features, as well as macroeconomic fluctuations and
industry structure, on cartel duration. They find that firm-specific measures of impatience are
systematically related to cartel breakup. In a later work (Levenstein and Suslow, 2016), these
authors found a positive relationship between market interest rates and probability of cartel
breakup, outcome that they did not find for the international cartels analyzed in their previous
work.
Table 1 summarizes the contributions of the literature on the relationship between collusion
and business cycles.
As we have seen above, theory papers are offering different conclusions with respect to the
relationship of cartel stability and the business cycle, and also the evidence provided by the
empirical literature is mixed. There is a gap in the literature to study more in depth to what
extend and in which circumstances collusion is pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical.
Instead of relying in country data, we are going use data coming from business surveys
regarding firm-specific business dynamics and price expectations, and also industry specific pro-
duction dynamics to analyze startups and breakups of cartel discovered and sanctioned by the
European Commission.
Therefore, the objective of this paper is to study empirically whether the conditions or the
variables related to the firm and industry business cycle affect the stability of collusive agree-
ments, and to what extend such variables affect the formation and breakup of these illegal
agreements symmetrically.
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Table 1.1: Empirical and theoretical literature regarding business cycles and cartel
formation/breakups.
Year Authors Methodology Database Results
1986 Rotemberg andSaloner Theoretical -
Collusion is counter-
cyclical. Collusion is more
difficult in booms, easier in
downturns.
1991 Haltiwanger andHarrington Theoretical -
Collusion is pro-cyclical.
Firms find easier to collude
during booms, more difficult to
collude during recessions.
1997 Bagwell andStaiger Theoretical -
Collusion is pro-cyclical,
more likely in booms, when de-
mand growth rates are posi-
tively correlated through time.
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Source: Own elaboration.
1.3 Data
The dataset has been constructed from the European Commission’s decisions in cartel cases
between 1976 and 2012. The European Commission has sanctioned 121 cartels7 over this period.
Most of these cartels were discovered due to investigations initiated by the Commission’s own
initiative or following complaints by third parties (67 cartel cases), and the other 54 cartel cases
have been detected under the EU Leniency Program since it was set up in 1996.
7Further information regarding the nature of these cartels can be found in Ordóñez-de-Haro, Borrell and
Jiménez (2018).
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From the published Commission’s decisions we obtained information regarding the forma-
tion and breakup date of the cartels. The former corresponds to the first moment for which the
authority has evidence of a collusive agreement, which usually is a date before the starting date
of the investigation. The latter is the moment in which the cartel breaks up, which could be a
date before or after the opening of the investigation procedures.
In this paper, we are going to analyze the likelihood of two different events across time
(months): (1) the event of a cartel setup in the manufacturing industry in the EU in any month
from January 1997 to December 2012 according to the European Commission files of sanctioned
cartels; (2) the event of a cartel breakup in the manufacturing industry in the EU in any month
from January 1997 to December 2012 according to the European Commission files of sanctioned
cartels. We also double check whether the introduction of the leniency program in 1996 changed
the impact of economic cycles on cartel set up and breakup using evidence of the previous pre-
leniency period from January 1991 to December 19968.
When studying cartel breakups, we restrict the empirical analysis to the cartels for which the
breakups are due to cartel internal reasons. We qualify a cartel breakup as one due to "internal
reasons" whenever the cartel breakup date precedes the date at which the investigation started,
and also all the cases that start by a leniency application.
Recall that cartel investigations may have been launched by four different means: (1) Com-
mission own initiative (ex-officio), (2) third party complaint, (3) after a cartel member notifica-
tion during the pre-2004 regime in which agreements among firms had to be notified and could
be authorized by the Commission (when they were not authorized, a cartel investigation could
also be launched), (4) after one or more cartel members notified their participation in a cartel
and applied for a lenient sanctioning treatment under the leniency program available since 1996
onwards.
We do only focus on these cases in which the break-up is due to internal reasons because we
are interested in analyzing firms’ behavior regarding cartel activities taking into account their
appraisal about the business cycle: firm perceptions of past business evolution, firm selling price
expectations, and EU real production cycles. We leave for further investigation the question of
what are the drivers of cartels breakups when there is an external action such as an European
Commission investigation triggered by the EC own initiative (with or without having denied an
agreement authorization), after a third partly complain, or when the break up occurs sometime
8The time series of business evolution and price expectations starts in January 1985, while the series of
production index at European level starts in January 1991. This is the reason why our pre-leniency sample only
goes back only until January 1991.
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after one of the cartel members apply for the leniency program.
We have also computed the date of the final decision adopted by the European Commis-
sion to create a variable called sanctioned cartels (the number cartels sanctioned every month),
which will control for the potential destabilizing effect of the European Commission cartel law
enforcement on existing cartels, and its deterrent effect on cartels that would not have formed yet.
We restrict the empirical analysis to the manufacturing industry sector (sector C in NACE
Rev.2 classification) because it is the only sector for which we have information for all the
independent variables, i.e., business evolution, price expectations and the production index9.
Although we are not able to exploit the fact that more and different industries different from
manufacturing are cartelized due to the unavailability of data of either the business surveys or
economic data, we do not consider this to be a major problem for two reasons.
First, 96 out of the 121 cartel cases sanctioned between 1976 and 2014 by the European
Commission that we use to construct our dataset belong to the manufacturing sector (79%)10.
As shown in Table 2, 71 out of 98 cartels sanctioned between 1991 and 2012, the whole time
period pre- and post-leniency program used below in our estimates, belong to the manufacturing
sector (72%). And also, 67 out of 85 cartels sanctioned in the post-leniency program period from
1997 to 2012 belong to the manufacturing industry (79%).
In addition, 48 out of the 96 cartel cases in the manufacturing sector have been discovered
under the Leniency Program (50%)11, which means that the firms cooperate with the European
Commission and therefore, the date of formation reflects on average more closely the start of
the collusive agreement12.
On the other hand, if we look at the EU-27’s non-financial business economy at the NACE
section level, the manufacturing sector is summing up a wide variety of activities. Addition-
ally, around 10% of all enterprises belong to the manufacturing industry. Moreover, within the
EU-27’s non-financial business economy, in 2012, the manufacturing was the second largest in
terms of its contribution to employment (22.6%) and the largest contributor to value added
(26.8%)13. Given the importance of the manufacturing sector in the EU, it is relevant to focus
9There are some sectors for which we have information, but not enough data to perform the full analysis. The
baseline regressions including more sectors will be presented in the robustness check section.
10Sorting the sectors by number of cases discovered, the Manufacturing Sector is followed by the Transportation
and Storage Sector (sector H), which has 12 cases.
11In 54 out of 121 cartel cases considered (44.63%), the European Commission’s investigation was initiated
following applications for leniency.
12Actually, 15 out of the 19 cases for which we analyze cartel formation and 45 out of the 50 cartels for which
we study the breakup in the period 1997-2012 were discovered under the leniency program (78.95% of the formed
ones and 90% of the broken ones).
13Source: Eurostat.
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in this industry. Moreover, as Levenstein and Suslow (2014) state, there are some industries
that seem particularly prone to collusion activity. Specifically they cited those characterized by
high fixed costs as in manufacturing sector.
Table 1.2: Summary of cartel cases sanctioned by the European Commission
(1991-1996 & 1997-2012) (% of cartels belonging to the manufacturing sector).
All Sectors Manufacturing Sector
1991-1996 1997-2012 1991-1996 1997-2012
Cartel sanctioned 13 85 4 (30.77%) 67 (78.82%)
Cartel set up 33 29 25 (75.76%) 19 (65.52%)
Cartel break up 21 80 12 (57.14%) 62 (77.5%)
Cartel break up (internal reasons): A+B, A+a+b 7 59 5 (71.43%) 50 (84.75%)
A. Breakup before opening investigation (no leniency) 4 8 2 (50%) 5 (83.33%)
B. Investigation started by leniency program 3 51 3 (100%) 45 (88.24%)
a. Breakup after leniency application 0 19 0 15 (78.95%)
b. Breakup before leniency application 3 32 3 (100%) 30 (93.75%)
Note: Own elaboration from EC publicly available decisions.
As Table 2 shows, 50 out of 67 cartels of the manufacturing industry sanctioned by the EC
after 1997 broke up due to internal reasons, not as a result of a targeted investigation initiated
by the Commission on its own initiative or following a complaint. 45 out of those 50 were ini-
tially investigated using the leniency program, so the leniency application of one cartel member
enabled the Commission to initiate an investigation: 30 of them broke apart before the leniency
application, while 15 of them broke apart after the leniency application. The other 5 out of 50
broke apart before the Commission started the investigation by its own initiative or third party
complaint, not using the leniency program. Finally, only 19 (discovered) cartels were started
up after January 1997. Table 2 also shows that most of the cartels sanctioned belong to the
manufacturing industry, particularly in the 1997 to 2012 period.
The variables we are going to model are denoted as formed cartels and broken cartels. The
former tells us the number of (discovered) cartels that were formed each month14 of the database
in the manufacturing sector. The latter is the number of (discovered) cartels in the manufactur-
ing sector that were broken due to internal reasons each month of the period studied15.
As summarized in Table 3, the variable regarding monthly cartel formation takes value from
0 to 3, while the one of monthly cartel breakup takes value from 0 to 4. The variable sanctioned
cartels16 takes value from 0 to 6, which means that up to 6 cartels were sanctioned the same
14Brenner (2009) also analyzes time series data on discovered cartels by the EC.
15As explained before, we include all the cartels that collapsed due to internal causes: they had broken up
before they were discovered by the Commission or a third party, and also those that broke because one of the
members applied for leniency. In the latter case, we use the date of the application as breakup date if application
occurred before the collusive agreement completely collapsed as leniency applications are noticed and the data
shows that it does not take long to completely collapse.
16This variable includes the cartels sanctioned by the European Commission every month in all sectors, since
the discovery of a relevant cartel in another sector could increase the deterrent effect of the Commission in any
unrelated sector. Results are robust to considering only the cartel cases sanctioned in the manufacturing sector.
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month by the Commission.
Figure 1 depicts all three variables over time. As we focus in the cartels sanctioned between
January 1997 and December 2012 that at the same time were formed in that time span, the
figure shows that cartels sanctioned were mostly set up at the first half of the period under
study. By contrast, the figure shows that sanctioned cartels break up all along the period under
study, since many of them were formed before 1997. The cartels sanctioned during the period
of study refer to cartels born before or after 1997 in any sector, although the cartels sanctioned
in Figure 1 refer only to the manufacturing sector.
Figure 1.1: Number of monthly formed, sanctioned and broken by internal reasons
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Source: Own elaboration from EC publicly available decisions.
As noted above, we introduce a novel approach with regard to the related literature by taking
into account business managers’ expectations. The variables business evolution and price expec-
tations were obtained from the Business and Consumer Surveys, which is a harmonized survey
managed by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Com-
mission17. The data consists18 of monthly time series according to the Classification of economic
17The Joint Harmonized EU Program of Business and Consumer Surveys, User Guide, 2007. Source: http:
//ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/index_en.htm
18Additionally, the Business Survey presents the data at a more aggregated level. In particular, they divide
the NACE sectors in five big categories: industry, construction, retail trade, services sector and financial services.
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activities in the European Community (NACE) at the two digits level, so it is disaggregated by
sector and sub-sector.
According to Taylor and McNabb (2007), the business confidence indicator is pro-cyclical
and it can generally predict movements in GDP over the business cycle and downturns.
Since the process of forming a cartel takes some time, we are glad to use the survey variable
on price expectations instead of the current price as the decision of engaging in cartels today
could be more affected by price expectations in the future than by current price levels.
Both variables are indices19, and they correspond respectively to the questions "how has
your production developed over the past 3 months?" and "how do you expect your selling price
to change over the next 3 months?" The surveys are conducted at firm level, and then the data
is classified and aggregated by stratum (i.e., by sector) and countries, using adequate weights20.
The geographical coverage of the surveys includes all Member States as well as the candidate
countries, although we do only use Member States results. The harmonized surveys are car-
ried out at national level by national institutes and offices. The sample size for each survey
varies across countries according to the heterogeneity of their economies and their population
size. The sample of the industry survey includes more than 38,000 units that are surveyed ev-
ery month, in the first two-three weeks of each month. The industry survey is largely qualitative.
The survey’s questions of interest for our study admit three possible responses: increase,
remain unchanged and decrease. Answers obtained from the surveys are aggregated in the form
of balances, which are constructed as the difference in the percentage of positive and negative
answers. The information provided allows the use of a range of variables to monitor cyclical
dynamics.
We have used non-seasonally adjusted data for business evolution, price expectations, and
production EU. The variable production EU has been obtained from Eurostat. The time series
corresponds to monthly data of the volume index of production in industry (manufacturing sec-
tor), at European level (EU19) and where 2010=100. The variable production change measures
the difference between production EU in a given month and the previous month, if it is denoted
with (-1); and the difference with respect to the same month in the previous year if it is denoted
with (-12). Similarly, the variable production growth rate accounts for the growth rate of the
variable production EU. The descriptive statistics of these variables are shown in Table 3.
This classification is the one we use for our analysis.
19The data of the Business and Consumer Survey is at EU level.
20See footnote 12. Further information about the data treatment can be found in the Methodological User
Guide.
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Table 1.3: Summary statistics (1997-2012).
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Formed Cartels 192 0.099 0.36 0 3
Broken Cartels due to Internal Reasons 192 0.260 0.58 0 4
Business Evolution 192 0.312 12.01 -49 19
Price Expectations 192 4.562 7.92 -14 23
Sanctioned Cartels 192 0.443 0.82 0 6
Production EU 192 101.23 10.19 68.8 122.8
Production Change (-1) 192 0.055 12.15 -28.1 30.5
Production Change (-12) 192 0.911 6.21 -25.4 9.2
Production Growth Rate (-1) 192 0.009 0.13 -0.29 0.43
Production Growth Rate (-12) 192 0.012 0.06 -0.22 0.10
Source: Author’s computations from EC publicly available decisions and the
Business Survey. Manufacturing sector only.
1.4 Empirical strategy
The purpose of this paper is to study the drivers of cartel formation and breakup. We analyze
which is the role of managers’ perception about the evolution of their business and expectations
they have regarding the selling price, and also the effect of the industry production on the
dependent variables of interest. Our empirical strategy uses Poisson model estimations, given
that our dependent variable is a count variable. Even the value zero has positive probability of
occurrence in both cases (formed and broken cartels).
The basic Poisson model assumes that y given x has a Poisson distribution, and the density
of y given x is completely determined by the conditional mean. Another assumption imposed by
Poisson distribution is that the conditional variance is equal to the conditional mean. However,
since this assumption it not usually satisfied in the data, there are alternative characterizations
of the model such as the Negative Binomial Regression, when there is over-dispersion.
We have tested whether this is the case in our data, but the test concludes that there is no
over-dispersion, so we can estimate a Poisson regression. Nevertheless, even if it was the case,
according to Cameron and Trivedi (2009) the Poisson panel estimators rely on weaker distribu-
tional assumptions than the negative binomial model, so that it would be more robust to use the
Poisson panel estimators with cluster-robust standard errors to resolve the usual over dispersion.
We should also note that working with information regarding cartels means that we can
only know characteristics of the uncovered cartels. Therefore, if the variables formed or broken
cartels take the value of zero it could be because no cartel was formed or broken that specific
month or because it was formed or broken but it hasn’t been discovered. Unfortunately, we
cannot distinguish between these two types of selection, as it is also the case in the Zero Inflated
Poisson (ZIP) regression. However, this model tries to capture which are the relevant variables
that cause the count to be zero. Therefore, we have also worked with this alternative model
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specification, but results are not shown in the paper since the Voung (1989) test21 of ZIP vs
Poisson does not favor the former model.
Summing up, the equation of the full model estimated in order to estimate the relationship
between formed cartels and expectations is the following one22:
log (E (formed_cartelst|x)) = β0 + β1business_evolutiont + β2price_expectationst
+ β3sanctioned_cartelst + β4production_EUt
+ β5production_changet−1 + β6production_changet−12
+ β7production_growth_ratet−1 + β8productiongrowth_ratet−12
(1.1)
where x denotes the vector of independent variables. We estimate different specifications of the
model by gradually introducing the explanatory variables.
Regarding the estimation of the equation to explain why cartels break internally, the empir-
ical strategy is the same as in equation [1], but substituting the variable of formed cartels by
broken cartels as dependent variable.
log (E (broken_cartelst|x)) = β0 + β1business_evolutiont + β2price_expectationst
+ β3sanctioned_cartelst + β4production_EUt
+ β5production_changet−1 + β6production_changet−12
+ β7production_growth_ratet−1 + β8production_growth_ratet−12
(1.2)
As previously mentioned, we will gradually introduce covariates in both estimations in order
to control for different effects by groups of exogenous variables. Results are included in the
following section.
1.5 Results
The results of the Poisson regression model for equation [1] are shown in Table 4. As stated
above, we have considered alternative specifications of the model. Note that the standard errors
have been corrected using the Newey-West estimator in order to overcome potential problems of
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The results shown in the table are the point estimates
of the beta coefficients23.
First of all, we can observe how regardless of the model specification the managers’ percep-
tions of the evolution of the firm’s business in the last 3 months affects positively and significantly
21It tests the null hypothesis that the two models fit the data equally well.
22The error term does not appear in equation [1] because the model is expressed in terms of the conditional
expectation.
23They tell us that one unit increase in the independent variable will increase the average number of the
dependent variable by β percent.
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the number of cartels formed. Increases of the business evolution index in one unit will increase
the average number of formed cartels by around 5.3− 6.0%. This suggests that cartel formation
is strongly pro-cyclical with respect to firm growth: the likelihood of cartel set up is related to
firm growth in the near past.
Table 1.4: Poisson estimation results. Formed cartels (1997-2012).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Business Evolution 0.060** 0.053* 0.054* 0.067* 0.054** 0.080***(0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.034) (0.027) (0.031)
Price Expectations -0.072** -0.064** -0.071** -0.062** -0.075** -0.060*(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
Production EU -0.017*** -0.008* 0.003 -0.009** 0.008 -0.012***(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Sanctioned Cartels -1.065*** -1.106*** -1.067*** -1.127*** -1.064***(0.192) (0.200) (0.193) (0.205) (0.195)
Production Change (-1) -0.012**(0.006)
Production Change (-12) -0.033(0.038)
Production Growth Rate (-1) -1.708***(0.458)
Production Growth Rate (-12) -6.696*(3.542)
Constant -0.398 -1.135** -2.169*** -0.964** -2.615*** -0.620(0.472) (0.454) (0.736) (0.470) (0.663) (0.504)
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192
Chi2 4.610 6.607 6.717 6.739 7.033 7.082
p-value 0.203 0.158 0.243 0.241 0.218 0.215
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01 significance test. Newey-West standard errors within
brackets.
Secondly, the higher the prices are expected to be at the beginning of the month for the next
three months, the lower the number of cartels formed that month. The effect of an increase of
one unit in price expectations is that the formation of cartels is reduced between 6% and 7.5%.
On the other way round, collusion is more likely when firms expect a decline in prices in the
near future: collusion is more likely with expected declining pricing.
It is also remarkable that the number of total sanctioned cartels (in the manufacturing and
the other industries) in the same period influences negatively cartels formation. Since the deci-
sion of the European Commission is public, seeing that more cartels are being sanctioned seems
to be an effective deterrent because it could increase the perceived probability of being caught.
Finally, results show that the effect of the industry real production index at the EU level
negatively and significantly affects cartel formation in most of the specifications. This reflects
weak evidence that the pro-cyclicality of cartel formation and firm-specific business cycle is less
strong when the sector production is low. However, we cannot draw any conclusion regarding
the effect of the variables considering production growth in the sector on cartel setting up.
14
In our results for the post-leniency period, the business evolution has a positive effect on
cartel set up. Moreover, if firms’ managers expect that prices will increase in the current and
next two months, then fewer cartels are formed. Therefore, in this baseline model, what matters
most for cartel formation is the perception that businessmen have about the evolution of their
own production and the prices at which they expect to be selling their products in the market
the following months, while the sector production also affects the decision of cartelizing or not.
Empirical results regarding cartel set up appear to show that collusion is pro-cyclical with
respect to firm-specific business cycle, these results are robust to the ones obtained in the strand
of the theoretical literature started by the seminal paper of Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991)
who showed that it is easier to collude during booms and more difficult to collude during re-
cessions, as also in the paper by Bagwell and Staiger (1997), and in the case of non-binding
capacity constraints studied by Fabra (2006).
Table 5 presents the results of the estimations of equation [2] concerning the explanatory
variables of the breakup of cartels.
Table 1.5: Poisson estimation results. Internally broken cartels (1997-2012).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Business Evolution 0.019 0.019 0.019 -0.013 0.019 -0.009(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.031) (0.018) (0.032)
Price Expectations -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.018 -0.014 -0.018(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.021)
Production EU -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.000 0.004(0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007)
Sanctioned Cartels -0.055 -0.061 -0.057 -0.058 -0.057(0.120) (0.132) (0.118) (0.132) (0.121)
Production Change (-1) -0.003(0.009)
Production Change (-12) 0.077**(0.039)
Production Growth Rate (-1) -0.140(0.766)
Production Growth Rate (-12) 7.025*(4.115)
Constant -1.092 -1.150 -1.405 -1.606** -1.266 -1.787***(0.777) (0.847) (1.440) (0.711) (1.341) (0.671)
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192
Chi2 1.256 1.342 1.382 2.623 1.353 2.454
p-value 0.740 0.854 0.926 0.758 0.929 0.783
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01 significance test. Newey-West standard errors
within brackets.
Contrary to equation [1], the Poisson estimations of the relationship between managers’ ap-
praisal of past production and selling price expectations and the breakup of cartels by internal
reasons in the manufacturing sector yield non-conclusive results. The number of cartels broken
does not appear to be related neither with the business evolution in the last three months, nor
with the level of prices expected by firms’ managers, nor with the number of sanctioned cartels
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in the same or the previous months. However, we will see later on that we can extract some
conclusions regarding cartel breakup when we include more sectors in the specification of our
model24.
Summing up, all these results combined tell us that there are asymmetries in the effect of
economic cycles on cartel setup and breakup: if the firm is doing well in terms of their own pro-
duction and the managers expect their selling price to decrease in the next periods, then firms
will get involved in a cartel to get larger profits (pro-cyclical cartel setup). On the other hand,
no conclusions can be drawn with respect to the collapse of cartels in the manufacturing sector,
although we will see that including more sectors allow us to identify some effects of firm-specific
and EU-wide business evolution, and price expectations, on cartel breakup.
1.6 Robustness Checks
In this section, we carefully deepen the analysis of our time series and check whether our re-
sults are robust to different model specifications. We first consider the inclusion of more sectors
in the baseline regressions. The reason why we include this framework as robustness check is
that due to data limitations we cannot perform all the desired analyses on the sample formed
by several sectors.
Next, we follow the procedure explained below to check for endogeneity problems in both
cartel formation and cartel breakup. We will also double check to what extend the relationship
between economic cycles and collusion has remained stable in the post-leniency period (1997-
2012) with respect to the pre-leniency period (1991-1996) in the EU. Finally, we analyze the
relationship between sanctioned cartels and business cycles, in order to understand the economic
conditions under which the Commission makes decisions, and to rule out any identification prob-
lem of the estimated relationship between cartel formation/breakup and business cycles.
1.6.1 Inclusion of additional sectors and endogeneity
The first step we follow, in order to obtain more robust and reliable results, is to include
more sectors in our specifications to introduce more variability. We will see that results hold in
the case of cartel formation, and we obtain some effects in the case of cartel breakup.
24Levenstein and Suslow (2011) study the determinants of cartel breakup. The authors find that fluctuations
in firm-specific discount rates have a significant effect on cartel duration, whereas market interest rates do no.
Also, other cartel organization features are relevant in explaining cartel duration.
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Secondly, we consider a potential problem as robustness check. There are grounds for the
suspicion that the variable price expectations may present endogeneity problems, since the ex-
pectations expressed by the firm’s manager may reflect the fact that the firm has recently decided
to join a cartel (decision which may or may not be observed by the econometrician later on).
Therefore, we instrument price expectations using covariates that could explain these expec-
tations but that are exogenous to the cartel formation25. By using a model of Instrumental
Variables, we manage to capture only the exogenous part of this variable, this is to say, to cap-
ture the underlying variance in price expectations independently from being cartelized or not. As
excluded instruments we use one lag of the dependent variable26, the evolution of the price index
in other sectors (Construction and Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply) and time
fixed effects. We conclude that results do not change when this model is used and according to
the test of endogeneity, it is not necessary to treat the variable price expectations as endogenous.
1.6.1.1 Cartel Setup
As explained above, we start by showing the results of the inclusion of additional sectors in
the main regressions of cartel formation. Results are shown in Table 6a and 6b. First note that
the conclusions obtained from Table 4 still hold: business evolution affects cartel formation posi-
tively and significantly and price expectations affect cartel formation negatively and significantly.
However, the variable production is not significant in this setting, while the effect of turnover
is negative, and statistically significant. Similarly to the results regarding the manufacturing
sector, this reflects weak evidence that the pro-cyclicality of cartel formation and firm-specific
business cycle is less strong when the sector turnover is low.
25This idea has been obtained from Perdiguero (2010), although the procedure is slightly different in our case.
26Results do not change if the lag of the instrumented variable is not used as instrument.
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Table 1.6: Poisson estimation results. Formed cartels (1997-2012). Additional sectors.
Table 1.6.A Poisson estimation results. Formed cartels (1997-2012). Sectors C, F, H &
K.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Business Evolution 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.105*** 0.132*** 0.105*** 0.138***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Price Expectations -0.092*** -0.093*** -0.087*** -0.088*** -0.089*** -0.085***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Turnover EU -0.080*** -0.070*** -0.077*** -0.055*** -0.075*** -0.056***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sanctioned Cartels -0.778*** -0.763*** -0.671*** -0.765*** -0.668***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Change Turnover (-1) 0.014***(0.000)
Change Turnover (-12) -0.024***(0.000)
Growth Rate Turnover (-1) 0.703***(0.000)
Growth Rate Turnover (-12) -3.329***(0.001)
Constant 5.064*** 4.363*** 4.996*** 2.836*** 4.811*** 3.013***(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 516 516 515 504 515 504
Pseudo-R2 0.355 0.368 0.373 0.337 0.372 0.338
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01 significance test. Cluster standard errors by sector within
brackets.
Table 1.6.B Poisson estimation results. Formed cartels (1997-2012). Sectors C, G, H &
N.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Business Evolution 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.105*** 0.132*** 0.105*** 0.138***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Price Expectations -0.092*** -0.093*** -0.087*** -0.088*** -0.089*** -0.085***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Turnover EU -0.080*** -0.070*** -0.077*** -0.055*** -0.075*** -0.056***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sanctioned Cartels -0.778*** -0.763*** -0.671*** -0.765*** -0.668***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Change Turnover (-1) 0.014***(0.000)
Change Turnover (-12) -0.024***(0.000)
Growth Rate Turnover (-1) 0.703***(0.000)
Growth Rate Turnover (-12) -3.329***(0.001)
Constant 5.064*** 4.363*** 4.996*** 2.836*** 4.811*** 3.013***(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 516 516 515 504 515 504
Pseudo-R2 0.355 0.368 0.373 0.337 0.372 0.338
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01 significance test. Cluster standard errors by sector within
brackets.
On the other hand, we analyze the results obtained from the IV estimation, which are sum-
marized in Table 7. The partial R2 is high, which tells us that the additional instruments are
highly correlated with the potentially endogenous variable after partialling out the effect of the
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other independent variables. Also the Shea’s adjusted partial R2 is high, which shows that the
component of price expectations that is orthogonal to the other regressors can be explained by
the component of the predicted value of price expectations that is orthogonal to the predicted
values of the other regressors in the model.
As hinted above, we are interested in analyzing whether the variable price expectations can
be treated as exogenous, in which case the OLS estimation would be more efficient than the IV
estimation. We test the null hypothesis, that the variable can be treated as exogenous, with
Wooldridge’s score test (Robust Score) and the regression-based test (Robust Regression). The
difference between these tests is that the former assumes that the variables being tested are
exogenous when estimating the error term’s variance, while the latter assumes that the variables
being tested are endogenous. According to the results of Table 7, the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected.
Table 1.7: IV estimation results. Formed cartels (1997-2012).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Business Evolution 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.006 0.005** 0.008(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
Price Expectations -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007* -0.008** -0.007*(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Production EU -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Sanctioned Cartels -0.045** -0.046** -0.044** -0.047** -0.045**(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Production Change (-1) -0.001(0.002)
Production Change (-12) -0.003(0.009)
Production Growth Rate (-1) -0.143(0.162)
Production Growth Rate (-12) -0.671(0.960)
Constant 0.290 0.245 0.168 0.263 0.126 0.299(0.239) (0.235) (0.326) (0.237) (0.300) (0.248)
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192
R2 0.018 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.030
Robust Score Chi2 0.642 0.555 0.591 0.592 0.569 0.590
Robust Score p-value 0.423 0.456 0.442 0.442 0.451 0.443
Robust Regression F 0.634 0.542 0.575 0.574 0.555 0.572
Robust Regression p-value 0.427 0.463 0.449 0.450 0.457 0.450
Overident. Score Chi2 19.502 19.868 19.908 19.916 19.967 19.996
Overident. Score p-value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Partial R2 0.940 0.941 0.937 0.940 0.938 0.939
Shea’s Adjusted Partial R2 0.916 0.915 0.910 0.913 0.910 0.913
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01 significance test. Robust standard errors within
brackets
1.6.1.2 Cartel Breakup
We follow the same procedure used for the robustness check of cartel formation for the case
of cartel breakup. We estimate the Poisson model including more sectors to check the robustness
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of the results obtained in the baseline model.
The models presented in Table 8a and 8b are more informative than the baseline case con-
sidered in Table 5. The variable business evolution has a positive and significant effect on cartel
breakup. In fact, broken cartels increase by around 2.7% (1.8− 2.3%) if the business evolution
index increases by one unit. This represents evidence of pro-cyclical collusion with respect to
cartel breakups when economic cycles are measured using firm-specific business evolution. How-
ever, this pro-cyclicality is less strong when the sector production has increased with respect to
the previous month or turnover is high.
This result is in line with the one obtained in the case of cartel formation: when the pro-
duction faced by an individual firm has evolved positively in the last months it is more likely
to form a cartel, and if the firms are already in a cartel, then it is also more difficult to sustain
collusion since it is more likely that a cartel breaks up. Unlike in the case of cartel formation,
the number of cartels broken is only related with the level of prices expected by firms’ managers
or with the number of sanctioned cartels when services sectors are considered together with the
manufacturing sector.
Moreover, the breakup of the cartel is more likely to occur the lower the production growth
is with respect to the previous month or the lower the turnover of the sector is. Thus, collusion
seems to be pro-cyclical with respect to cartel breakups when economic cycles are measured
using industry wide real EU production.
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Table 1.8: Poisson estimation results. Internally broken cartels (1997-2012). Additional
sectors.
Table 1.8.A Poisson estimation results. Internally broken cartels (1997-2012). Sectors
C, F, H & K.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Business Evolution 0.027*** 0.027** 0.027** -0.001 0.027** 0.002(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.011) (0.018)
Price Expectations -0.028 -0.027 -0.028 -0.032 -0.028 -0.032(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Production EU 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.006(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Sanctioned Cartels -0.014 -0.019 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017(0.070) (0.072) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069)
Production Change (-1) -0.002***(0.001)
Production Change (-12) 0.073***(0.027)
Production Growth Rate (-1) -0.149***(0.035)
Production Growth Rate (-12) 6.736**(2.716)
Constant -1.362*** -1.377*** -1.573*** -1.770*** -1.494*** -1.947***(0.485) (0.410) (0.364) (0.518) (0.428) (0.590)
Observations 636 636 633 600 633 600
Pseudo-R2 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.280 0.285 0.279
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01 significance test. Robust standard errors within brackets.
Table 1.8.B Poisson estimation results. Internally broken cartels (1997-2012). Sectors
C, G, H & N.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Business Evolution 0.023** 0.023** 0.018* 0.024 0.018* 0.025(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.018)
Price Expectations 0.017** 0.017** 0.029*** 0.006*** 0.029*** 0.006***(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001)
Turnover EU -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.053*** -0.032*** -0.052*** -0.032***(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Sanctioned Cartels 0.038*** 0.039*** -0.054*** 0.039*** -0.054***(0.007) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004)
Change Turnover (-1) 0.026***(0.001)
Change Turnover (-12) 0.007(0.020)
Growth Rate Turnover (-1) 2.144***(0.065)
Growth Rate Turnover (-12) 0.321(1.946)
Constant 2.417*** 2.455*** 3.415*** 1.537*** 3.334*** 1.524***(0.171) (0.181) (0.202) (0.184) (0.221) (0.097)
Observations 516 516 515 504 515 504
Pseudo-R2 0.308 0.308 0.317 0.298 0.317 0.298
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01 significance test. Robust standard errors within brackets.
Finally, we look at the results of the IV estimation. Also in this case both the partial R2 and
the Shea’s adjusted partial R2 are high. Still, our test of interest is the potential endogeneity of
the variable price expectations. At the 5% level of significance we cannot reject the null hypoth-
esis of the variable being exogenous according to both the statistic of the Robust Score and the
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statistic of the Robust Regression.
Table 1.9: IV estimation results. Internally broken cartels (1997-2012).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Business Evolution 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.003 0.004 -0.003(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007)
Price Expectations -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Production EU -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Sanctioned Cartels -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014(0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054)
Production Change (-1) -0.000(0.004)
Production Change (-12) 0.015(0.012)
Production Growth Rate (-1) -0.009(0.364)
Production Growth Rate (-12) 1.472(1.353)
Constant 0.346 0.333 0.294 0.245 0.326 0.214(0.421) (0.434) (0.559) (0.413) (0.529) (0.403)
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192
R2 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.010 0.005 0.009
Robust Score Chi2 1.191 1.376 1.391 1.340 1.417 1.381
Robust Score p-value 0.275 0.241 0.238 0.247 0.234 0.240
Robust Regression F 1.154 1.330 1.335 1.289 1.363 1.329
Robust Regression p-value 0.284 0.250 0.249 0.258 0.244 0.251
Overident. Score Chi2 41.229 42.218 41.757 42.174 41.845 42.032
Overident. Score p-value 0.858 0.832 0.844 0.833 0.842 0.837
Partial R2 0.940 0.941 0.937 0.940 0.938 0.939
Shea’s Adjusted Partial R2 0.916 0.915 0.910 0.913 0.910 0.913
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01 significance test. Robust standard errors
within brackets.
1.6.2 Pre-leniency program period
So far, we have only analyzed the cartel cases formed or broken in the manufacturing sector
during the period January 1997 to December 2012. However, both the formation and breakup of
these cartels have been affected by the existence of the leniency program, which was introduced
in July 1996 in the European Union.
This program could produce two opposite effects in the dynamics of cartels birth and death.
On the one hand, the members of a discovered cartel case could benefit from a fine reduction
under certain circumstances. Therefore, the ex-ante profits from collusion are higher than in the
case in which the sanctioned firm has to pay the full fine, for a given probability of detection,
which means that the likelihood of cartel formation increases. On the other hand, the incentives
to deviate and break up the cartel are higher under the leniency program, since the first member
revealing the existence of the illegal collusive agreement could get a higher or even a full fine
reduction. Thus, we should see that the probability of breakup is higher.
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Summing up, the introduction of the leniency program may have affected the way in which
the independent variables affect our dependent variables of interest. For this reason, we focus
in this section in the period from January 1991 to December 1996. Following the methodology
explained in Section 4, we will study how do the business evolution, the price expectations, the
sanctioned cartels and the production at the European level affect the formation and breakup
of cartels during this period.
At Table 2, we can also see how the number of cartels formed in the period 1991-1996 (33
cartels) is higher than the number of cartels formed after 1997 (29 cartels), while the number
of broken and internally broken cartels is significantly lower in the period 1991-1996 (21 and 7
respectively) than in the period 1997-2012 (80 and 59 respectively).
In Figure 2 we can observe the formation, breakup and sanction distribution of the discovered
cartels over time the whole time period 1976 to 2012. The number of internally broken cartels
explodes since 1997, and the number of sanctioned cartels clearly increases since 1997 onwards.
Figure 1.2: Number of monthly formed, sanctioned and broken by internal reasons







1976m1 1981m1 1986m1 1991m1 1996m1 2001m1 2006m1 2011m1







1976m1 1981m1 1986m1 1991m1 1996m1 2001m1 2006m1 2011m1







1976m1 1981m1 1986m1 1991m1 1996m1 2001m1 2006m1 2011m1







1976m1 1981m1 1986m1 1991m1 1996m1 2001m1 2006m1 2011m1
Number of sanctioned cartels
Source: Own elaboration from EC publicly available decisions.
We estimate the same equations than before, now for the cartels startups and breakups be-
tween 1991 and 1996, in the pre-leniency period using the monthly data described in Table 10.
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Table 1.10: Summary statistics (1991-1996).
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Formed Cartels 72 0.347 0.585 0 2
Broken Cartels due to Internal Reasons 72 0.069 0.306 0 2
Business Evolution 72 -4.194 10.954 -26 19
Price Expectations 72 8.389 8.187 -3 32
Sanctioned Cartels 72 0.181 0.422 0 2
Production EU 72 86.306 8.615 58.2 96.1
Production Change (-1) 71 -0.039 12.348 -26.3 30.4
Production Change (-12) 60 -0.158 3.693 -7.4 7.5
Production Growth Rate (-1) 71 0.013 0.170 -0.3 0.5
Production Growth Rate (-12) 60 -0.0007 0.043 -0.08 0.09
Source: Own elaboration from EC publicly available decisions and the Business Survey.
Manufacturing sector only.
In Table 11 we can see the results of the Poisson model estimation of cartel formation, and
in Table 12 the results of cartel breakup.
Again, for the period before the leniency program (1991-1996), we find that collusion seems
to be weakly counter-cyclical when looking at cartel setup from the industry wide cycles per-
spective, while collusion also appears to be counter-cyclical when looking at cartel breakup from
both the firm-specific business cycle and now the sector economic conditions too.
However, in the pre-leniency period, the drivers of cartel setup and break up are different
with respect to the post-leniency period. The driver of cartel setup in the pre-leniency period
is the firm-level business evolution with negative sign (Table 11), while the drivers of cartel
setup in the post-leniency period are the firm-level business evolution, price expectations and
the industry-wide production at the EU level (Table 4).
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Table 1.11: Poisson estimation results. Formed cartels (1991-1996).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Business Evolution -0.016*** -0.017** -0.022*** -0.088** -0.023*** -0.095**(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.041) (0.006) (0.039)
Price Expectations -0.020** -0.016* 0.006 -0.016 0.005 -0.020*(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
Production EU 0.020 0.023 -0.025 0.032* -0.011 0.032**(0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015)
Sanctioned Cartels -0.835*** -0.621** -1.360** -0.665** -1.404**(0.277) (0.285) (0.586) (0.285) (0.580)
Production Change (-1) 0.041***(0.005)
Production Change (-12) 0.209(0.144)
Production Growth Rate (-1) 2.310***(0.368)
Production Growth Rate (-12) 20.419*(11.975)
Constant -0.016*** -0.017** -0.022*** -0.088** -0.023*** -0.095**(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.041) (0.006) (0.039)
Observations 72 72 71 60 71 60
Chi2 1.779 3.075 8.371 5.756 7.347 6.208
p-value 0.619 0.545 0.137 0.331 0.196 0.287
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01 significance test. Newey-West standard errors within
brackets.
The drivers of cartel breakup in the pre-leniency period27 seem to be mostly the business
evolution and price expectations at the firm level (Table 12) and also the EU industry real pro-
duction, while in the post-leniency period price expectations do not affect breakup and the EU
industry real production is not significant and the variable turnover has the opposite sign (Table
8a and Table 8b). Note that this last statement should be considered carefully, given that the
number of cartels broken in the manufacturing sector due to internal reasons is very low during
the period January 1991-December 1996.
27We double-checked as previously whether these results for the pre-leniency period were robust to the presence
of endogeneity of price expectations, and we found that they are robust indeed. Results from these robustness
checks are available upon request from the authors.
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Table 1.12: Poisson estimation results. Internally broken cartels (1991-1996).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Business Evolution 0.419*** 0.439*** 0.498*** 0.440*** 0.488*** 0.446***(0.031) (0.045) (0.046) (0.034) (0.046) (0.032)
Price Expectations -0.260*** -0.268*** -0.318*** -0.263*** -0.313*** -0.261***(0.018) (0.020) (0.023) (0.037) (0.022) (0.035)
Production EU 0.353*** 0.349*** 0.403*** 0.342*** 0.394*** 0.333***(0.059) (0.057) (0.052) (0.061) (0.051) (0.061)
Sanctioned Cartels 0.392 -0.027 0.385 -0.002 0.388(0.347) (0.319) (0.396) (0.318) (0.384)
Production Change (-1) -0.033***(0.011)
Production Change (-12) -0.024(0.173)
Production Growth Rate (-1) -1.974***(0.682)
Production Growth Rate (-12) -4.815(15.360)
Constant -34.947*** -34.791*** -39.449*** -34.143*** -38.631*** -33.250***(5.613) (5.434) (4.906) (5.962) (4.907) (5.980)
Observations 72 72 71 60 71 60
Chi2 3.903 3.989 4.067 3.940 4.124 4.020
p-value 0.272 0.407 0.540 0.558 0.532 0.546
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01 significance test. Newey-West standard errors within brackets.
1.6.3 Sanctioned cartels
In this section we analyze the relationship between sanctioned cartels and the economic in-
dicators, in order to understand the economic conditions under which the Commission makes
decisions. Previous results show that sanctioned cartels have a deterrent effect on cartel forma-
tion, but there is no relationship between the cartels sanctioned each month and the internal
breakup of cartels. However, we have seen that the industry real production affects negatively
cartel breakup. A possible explanation would be that the Commission devotes more resources
to investigations28 and sanctions in downturns, which would increase the likelihood of internal
breakup of the cartel in order to apply for the leniency program before it is discovered by the
EC. Therefore, we study the effect of industry real production on sanctioned cartels to rule out
this explanation.
Results for the manufacturing sector are presented in Table 1329. It can be seen that produc-
tion affects positively the number of sanctioned cartels. Therefore, this leads to the conclusion
that managers’ internal decision of breaking up the cartel comes from the firm-specific business
cycle and the economic conditions, and not from the threat of being discovered by the EC.
28Regressions for the number of investigations and proceedings started each month were run, and no significant
effect was found.
29The estimations for the sample containing sectors C, F, H & K, and the sample of sectors C, G, H & N, yield
similar qualitative results.
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Table 1.13: Poisson Estimation Results. Sanctioned cartels (1997-2012).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Business Evolution -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.009(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.026) (0.013) (0.023)
Price Expectations 0.002 0.002 -0.009 0.002 -0.007 0.003(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
ProductionEU19 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.061*** 0.038*** 0.057*** 0.037***(0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008)
Production Change (-1) -0.033**(0.016)
Production Change (-12) 0.003(0.027)
Production Growth Rate (-1) -2.675*(1.459)
Production Growth Rate (-12) -0.549(2.185)
Constant -4.947*** -4.947*** -7.260*** -4.961*** -6.821*** -4.904***(0.891) (0.891) (1.574) (0.942) (1.491) (0.944)
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192
Chi2 7.248 7.248 12.738 7.253 11.742 7.256
p-value 0.064 0.064 0.013 0.123 0.019 0.123
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01 significance test. Newey-West standard errors within
brackets.
1.7 Conclusions
In this paper we shed some light about the impact of economic cycles on cartel formation and
cartel breaks up. Our results show that the average number of cartels formed increases when
the firm-level perceived business has evolved positively in the last three months and managers
expected in the previous period that their selling price would decrease in the next three months.
Moreover, high production at sector level affects cartel formation negatively. We also find evi-
dence that cartel breakups are also driven by past positive perceptions of firm-specific business
evolution, and somehow low EU production growth rate.
In conclusion, our results show that cartels are more likely to be formed in upturns, but
also that cartels tend to breakup also in booms. Cartels are more prone to be created when
managers consider that their firm production has evolved positively in the last three months
(growing firms) and when they expect a decrease in prices in the near future (with expected
declining prices). Cartels are more likely to collapse when firms face upturns in real demand
at the firm level, although this effect is less strong when the EU production growth rate is low.
Upturns in firm-specific business cycles appear to cause cartel turnovers: existing cartels collapse
while new ones are set up.
Collusion appears to be pro-cyclical with respect to cartel creation when cycles are measured
using firm-specific perceived business evolution, while collusion seems to be counter-cyclical with
regard to cartel demise when cycles are measured by firm-specific production (and also some-
how with respect to cartel formation when cycles are measured by industry-wide EU production).
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These results should be considered as a first approach to answer the question of interest as
there is some scarcity of data and we are just relying on the time series of cartel startups, cartel
breakups, cartels sanctioned and a set of business cycle variables. Ideally, the missing data prob-
lem should be overcome working with a panel data including more industries and territorial units.
New theoretical analysis should also be developed in line with the ones of Fabra (2006) as the
results we have obtained are consistent with the result that collusion might be pro-cyclical when
there is not capacity constraints, firms find it easier to collude during booms, while collusion
is counter-cyclical when capacity constraints are sufficiently tight, firms find it more difficult to
collude during booms. It might be the case that capacity constraints are on average not binding
in industries still not colluding (before collusion), so demand booms are driving the startup of
cartels. After having the cartels functioning, collusion might be the driver not only of price hikes
but also of coordinated reductions in the colluding industries capacities. As capacity constraints
get tight, collusion might become counter-cyclical, and cartels might finally breakup also during
booms.
In addition, important further research would be the study, from a theoretical and empirical
point of view, of the determinants and characteristics that make some cartels reach the screen
of the Antitrust Authority while others don’t. Finally, the impact of successive reforms of the
Community leniency program in the dynamics merits some further research.
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Cartelization: Is it worth it?
Abstract
Cartels are considered one of the most serious infringements in competition policy. Existing
competition policies aim at deterring cartel formation and sanctioning detected cartel cases.
However, a precise measure of how much firms benefit from collusion is needed in order to de-
sign effective policies. In this study I evaluate the causal effect of having been involved in a
collusive agreement on the revenues and profits of cartelized firms. Using a dataset of discovered
cartel cases in Spain from 1990 to 2014 and an alternative dataset of firms’ balance sheets, I can
distinguish between cartelized and non-cartelized firms (treatment and control group). After
having constructed a matched sample containing comparable collusive and non-collusive firms
(using the Nearest Neighbor Matching Algorithm), I can estimate the average treatment effect of
cartelization on firm profitability using the difference-in-difference estimator. Results show that
firms increase their revenues between 19% and 26% due to the collusive agreement on average,
while no significant effect is found on profits. However, when results by cartel duration are
considered, I find out that members belonging to a cartel that lasted long, not only do they
increase their revenues by 29%−50%, but also increase their profits by around 82−91.5% when
compared to the average net income of the firms involved in these types of cartels. Further
analysis shows that cartels that are profitable from the beginning tend to last longer and do not
apply for Leniency Programs. These results have several policy implications.
Keywords: Cartels; Competition Policy; Business Economics
JEL Codes: L4; D7; K2; M2
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2.1 Introduction
There is consensus in the economic literature that competition restrictions through collusion
are undesirable (Werden, 2009). Companies participating in a cartel produce less and earn higher
profits. Resources are misallocated and consumer welfare is reduced. In concrete, cartels are
considered one of the most flagrant infringements of competition law. Fighting against cartels
and preventing their formation is not only one of the main tasks of the European Commission
but also of most of the National Competition Authorities. Thus, analyses that contribute to a
better understanding of the determinants and consequences of the existence of cartels will be
helpful for both detection and deterrence of collusive agreements.
The existing competition policies aim at deterring and detecting cartel formation. In par-
ticular, national and European laws establish a punishment for firms in case they are detected
after having participated in a cartel. Fines depend on the gravity and the duration of the in-
fringement. However, there exists a cap of 10% of a business’ turnover in the year before the
Authority’s decision. As García-Verdugo(2016) points out, even though this percentage is con-
sidered the maximum effort that can be demanded to the firm, its origin is unclear. In any case,
this mechanism limits the potential negative effects the sanctions could impose on the firms.
Additionally, some lenient treatments and fines reductions are offered if the offender is the first
one revealing the existence of the collusive agreement to the Antitrust Authority.
Nevertheless, we lack a precise measure of how much firms profit from collusion. The existing
literature has studied the drivers of collusion and the determinants of cartel formation, stability
and breakup (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006 and 2011; Herold and Paha, 2017). It has also been
analyzed the overcharges applied by firms (Connor and Lande, 2008; Boyer and Kotchoni, 2015)
and the deterrence attained due to the action of the Antitrust Authorities’ activities or the
existence of the competition policy (Smuda, 2014; Bos, Davies, Harrington and Ormosi, 2018).
On the other hand, there are some papers that study the impact of competition policy
and Antitrust Authorities’ actions on firms’ profits and firms’ valuation (Aguzzoni, Langus and
Motta, 2013). However, to the best of my knowledge, the existing analyses regarding the effect
of collusion on profitability either lack a (good) counterfactual or do not address the problem of
causality properly.
In this project, I am interested in quantifying the impact of cartelization on firms’ profits
and revenues. Understanding how big are the incentives for firms to participate in a collu-
sive agreement is relevant and essential for the design and effectiveness of competition policy.
Therefore, in this study I use policy evaluation techniques to identify the causal effect of interest.
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For this purpose, I use a panel data of cartelized and non-cartelized Spanish firms for the pe-
riod 1992-2014 coming from two different sources. On the one hand, I use information provided
by the reports of the cartels that have been sanctioned by the Spanish Antitrust Authority in
the last two decades, which specify which firms have participated in a cartel case and when it
took place. On the other hand, I have information of the balance sheet of around 21,000 Spanish
firms. Therefore, I can identify which firms have participated in a discovered cartel case and
designate them as cartelized firms (treatment group), and which of them have not been cartelized
in principle (non-cartelized firms). After finding a good counterfactual or control group for the
treated firms, I can estimate the effect of belonging to a cartel on firms’ revenues and profits by
using the difference-in-differences estimator.
Results show that firms’ revenues increase around 19%-26% due to participation in a collusive
agreement. However, profits measured as net income or profit margin do not show a significant
impact on average. In the first three years of cartelization, which corresponds to the average
cartel duration in the full sample, firms increase their revenues by 14%-17%. More importantly,
only when the sample is split into short-lived and long-lived cartels a significant effect is found
on net income on the latter. This is, firms that belong to a cartel that lasted between 8 and
13 years increase their revenues by 29%-50%. Also, these revenues are translated into profits
since net income is on average 2.15-2.33 times higher than what these cartelized firms would
have earned if they had not been involved in a cartel case. These longer-lasting cartels appear
to be more profitable since initial periods. Finally, there exists some weak evidence that only
members of non-profitable cartels apply for the Leniency Program.
It is well known in the industrial organization literature that data related to collusive agree-
ments suffer from important limitations. Firstly, we can only work with discovered cartels since
we know nothing or very little from the underlying population. In this particular analysis, this
would mean that the control group could be cartelized but has not been discovered yet. In
that case, I would not find a significant difference in the outcome variable for the two groups.
Moreover, I would need the firm in the control group to be cartelized at the same exact time
than the treated one, to completely invalidate the results. However, the placebo tests provide
some evidence that this situation is unlikely to be happening in the data. Secondly, some firms
could benefit from the existence of collusion in the market since there is less competition. Or
alternatively, the colluding firms may try to expel these firms from the market. Thus, results
must be interpreted as the effect of belonging to a cartel and not as the effect of the existence
of a cartel.
The placebo tests presented below show there are no significant differences between the con-
trol group and the new artificial control group created to mimic the main analysis performed
in this study. This robustness check provides some signal about the possibility that these two
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potential issues may not be severe in this specific study. Despite the limitations of the data, the
present paper contributes to the existing literature analyzing the incentives firms have (on aver-
age) to participate in a cartel by constructing and using for this purpose the best counterfactual
possible given the limitations mentioned above.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I review the existing literature. After pre-
senting in Section 3 the data and the methodology used for the analysis, Section 4 discusses the
results. The last two sections present the robustness check of the analysis and summarize the
main ideas of the paper.
2.2 Literature Review
The relationship between profitability and collusion has already been addressed in the liter-
ature.
Asch and Seneca (1976) examine empirically the role of collusion on the profitability of
American manufacturing corporations during the period 1958-1967. The sample consists of 51
collusive firms that were found guilty in response to the Sherman Act and other 50 firms as con-
trols that were randomly drawn from the pool of non-collusive firms. They analyze the effect of
being a collusive firm (dummy variable) on profit rates. In order to isolate the effect of interest,
they control for other variables that may affect profits such as firm size (total assets), concen-
tration in the industry, advertising-sales ratio and growth of the firm during the period studied.
They find that the presence of collusive behavior is negatively associated with profitability. This
counterintuitive result makes them consider the problem of causality, which would have led to
a biased estimate of the effect of interest. They wonder whether collusion is a determinant of
firm profitability, with the resulting empirical conclusion that collusive behavior leads to lower
profit rates, or whether it is the case that an unsatisfactory profit performance by the firm will
provide an incentive to collude. Therefore, they study the effect of profits on the probability of
colluding and they find that poor profit performance increases the probability of collusion.
The empirical evidence regarding the impact of cartelization on firm’s profits is mixed. Leven-
stein and Suslow (2006) examine case studies of individual cartels and four types of cross-section
samples of cartels in order to analyze what determines cartels success. They find that some car-
tels are able to increase prices and profits to varying degrees. Lübbers (2009) studies the case
of the Rhenish Westphalian Coal Syndicate (RWCS), which took place between 1893 and 1913.
Employing event study methodology and using a dynamic panel data analysis, they assess the
effect of belonging to the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate (RWCS) on the reaction of stock
markets and on the companies’ profitability. He concludes that the RWCS had no significant
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effect on the profitability of its members.
Günster, Carree and van Dijk (2012) study how cartel formation and termination affects the
performance and efficiency of their members. They analyze the profitability, productivity and
innovation of cartel members using firm-specific data for a sample of 141 publicly listed firms
involved in 49 cartels infringements in the European Union between 1983 and 2004. The authors
compare the performance and efficiency of firms during the cartel period with those in the years
before the formation and after the termination of the cartel. Results show an increase in firms’
profitability (0.5%) during the cartel years and a decrease in efficiency. Another interesting
conclusion is that the longer cartels are in place, the more profitable its members become and
the weaker their incentives to produce efficiently.
On the other hand, the issue of self-selection into cartelization due to firms’ financial condi-
tions has been studied from different points of view. Bertrand, Lumineau and Fedorova (2014)
use a sample of firms involved in cartels prosecuted by the European Commission between 2001
and 2011 to study which are the factors that explain the likelihood of a firm entering a cartel.
They find that firms with relatively larger market share are more likely to participate in cartels
while firms with high liquidity ratio are less likely to participate in cartels. They also show that
relatively older firms tend to participate more in cartels and that the size of the firm is positively
related to the likelihood of cartelizing, although this effect varies with industry concentration.
Gustafson, Ivanov and Ritter (2015) look at airfare hikes occurring between January 2005
and December 2005 and they conclude that firm-level financial conditions determine the extent
to which firms collude. They find that in the context of low idle capacity, financially weak airlines
appear to value the immediate cash flows of increased cooperation, but only liquidity-constraint
firms seem willing to incur the cost of cooperative attempts. Thus, short-term liquidity and
long-term financial concerns increase an airline’s propensity to cooperate. Low levels of short-
term liquidity predict airfares hike initiation, while the long-term financial health of the firm
determines the hike success.
However, the existing approaches in the literature that study the relationship between col-
lusion and profitability have not addressed the problem of causality carefully enough and lack
a (good) counterfactual. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that aims at iden-
tifying and quantifying the causal effect of participating in a cartel on firms’ profitability after
having corrected for self-selection into treatment. Moreover, while the literature usually focuses
on one important case or one sector, a variety of collusive sectors are represented in the data.
The contributions of this paper are several. First of all, I make use of a control group in
order to be able to compare the evolution of revenues and benefits of cartelized firms with a
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group of reference. The second relevant contribution is that the problem of self-selection into
treatment has been considered. This is to say, there exists a set of factors that are conductive
to increase the likelihood of participating in a collusive agreement, and which are related to the
revenues and benefits a firm could earn. Therefore, the construction of the control group is based
on having cartelized and non-cartelized firms similar in these factors and also in the likelihood
of cartelization. The control group reflects as accurate as possible the potential evolution of
the cartelized firms had they not belonged to a cartel. In addition, the difference-in-differences
estimator allows for the existence of a difference in levels between the two groups, and con-
trols for common factors affecting all cartelized firms, affecting both groups of firms during the
cartelization period and for unobservable effects.
Table 2.1: Summary of the literature closely related to the present study.
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2.3 Data and Methodology
In order to study the question of interest, I have collected a panel dataset from the Iberian
Balance sheet Analysis System (SABI), which is a tool developed by Bureau Van Dijk. It con-
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tains information about the balance sheets of Spanish firms. In concrete, I had access to the
information of the 21,514 biggest Spanish firms measured as the Operating Revenues in the year
2014. The biggest firm earned e 22 billion in Operating Revenues in 2014 and the smallest
earned e 10m. The sample period ranges from 1992 to 2014.
On the other hand, I have information regarding the 68 cartel cases reports sanctioned by
the Spanish Antitrust Authorities from 1990 to 20141. A certain number of the cases were dis-
covered due to investigations started by the Authority’s own initiative or complaints and the
rest have been detected under the Leniency Program. From the reports I can obtain informa-
tion regarding the date of formation and breakup of the cartel. The date of formation refers
to the first moment for which the Authority has evidence of the existence of the cartel. The
breakup date is either the date in which the cartel died naturally, or the date in which they were
caught and had to stop colluding. In addition, I have information about which were the firms
that participated in the case and in which period they were a member of the cartel. There are
around 748 cartelized firms that have been sanctioned in the period 1990-2014. Specifically, 253
out of these 748 cartelized firms have been matched in the dataset containing the balance sheets.
Therefore, I can distinguish which firms have participated in a collusive agreement (cartelized)
from those that either have never participated in a cartel or have not been discovered yet (non-
cartelized). The fact that there may exist cartelized firms that we cannot classify as such is
one of the limitations of working with this data. However, I create a matched sample and use
the difference-in-differences estimator in order to study the effect of interest. If the firms in the
control group were a member of an undetected collusive agreement and I still find significant
results, this would mean that the undetected cartels are less profitable (or their members are
able to hide their illegal profits). Moreover, I only focus on firms that have been cartelized once
during my period sample, so I exclude from my analysis the repeated offenders. If a firm is
involved in many cases at the same time or over time, the intensity of treatment is different
for these observations. In addition, the effect of interest may not be linear with respect to the
number of cases in which the firm has been involved.
Since I am interested in the causal effect of cartelization on firms’ profits and revenues, it is
not enough to compare the outcome of cartelized firms pre- and post-treatment as in Günster,
Carree and van Dijk (2012). The reason being that changes in either observable or unobservable
characteristics, which are not related to cartelization, may have affected firms’ profits. On the
other hand, it is not appropriate to compare cartelized firms to any non-cartelized firm since
they may differ both in observable and unobservable characteristics and therefore it would not
be a good counterfactual for our treated observations.
1More information about the data can be found in Borrell, Jiménez and Ordóñez-de-Haro (2015), or in
Ordóñez-de-Haro, Borrell and Jiménez (2018) for the European case.
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In order to overcome these empirical difficulties, I combine two different strategies follow-
ing Artés, Jiménez and Perdiguero (2015). Firstly, I construct a matched sample where the
treatment and the control group are very similar in certain relevant observed characteristics.
Secondly, I estimate the effect of interest using the difference-in-differences estimator in the
matched sample in order to control for unobservable differences.
The different techniques employed in order to make sure that both cartelized and non-
cartelized firms are comparable and that results are trustworthy are explained in the following
subsections. It must be noted that this data processing, together with the imposed restrictions,
come at the cost of losing observations not only from non-cartelized firms but also from cartelized
firms. In the latter case, I start with the 253 cartelized firms that I can identify in the SABI
dataset. After truncating the sample, 239 cartelized firms are left. As explained above, I work
with those firms that have been involved in one cartel case only. With this restriction, 202 firms
remain in the sample. Additionally, since the matching has to be performed on pre-treatment
variables, I work with those firms that started being cartelized after 1995. With this, 38 firms
more are lost and I keep on working with 164 of them. After performing the matching, I end
up with 99 cartelized firms. Summary statistics of the characteristics of the cartel cases are
presented in Table 2.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics.
Total Matched Sample
Cartel Cases 68 27
Number of different firms 748 99
Number of affected sectors 12 9
Mean Mode Median Mean Mode Median
# of firms per cartel 12.24 6 7 3.67 1 2
Duration (in years) 3.27 2 4 4.03 1 2
Year of start 2001 2008 2004 2006 2008 2008
Year of end 2007 2009 2009 2010 2013 2011
Another important remark that needs to be made is that even if I am working with a dataset
of Spanish firms and cartel cases that affected the Spanish market, I have no reason to think that
there exist certain characteristics that would produce different results in comparison to other
countries. In particular, after the matching I end up with a sample of 196 firms, 99 cartelized
and 97 non-cartelized. From the 196 firms, I have been able to obtain information about the
global ultimate owner of 115 of them. Around 30% of the firms have an international global
owner, this figure being almost 34% in the case of cartelized firms. Therefore, this indicates that
both Spanish and non-Spanish firms that operate in several countries may be colluding in these
different locations too. Additionally, Spain is subject to common laws, as the other countries of
the European Union, so the environment under which these illegal collusive agreements emerge
is similar. Moreover, half of the sectors of the economy, classified by NACE Rev.2 sections
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classification, are represented both in the full sample and in the matched sample. Figures are
presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
2.3.1 Matched Sample
Before constructing the matched sample, I drop from the sample the outliers belonging to
the upper and lower tails of the distribution. The reason for doing this is that I may not be able
to find a good counterfactual for these observations. Since I am working with firms, an outlier in
terms of profits could drive the results of the estimation, and having a good counterfactual for
the cartelized firms is crucial for the validity of the results. Moreover, it is a common procedure
in the literature when working with firm-level data2.
In order to construct the matched sample, I have performed the matching five years before
the treatment takes place3. For example, if a firm starts being a member of a cartel in 2000,
I have looked for a control in the year 1995, using the characteristics of both firms in the year
1995. Then, I can track the evolution of the outcomes of cartelized and non-cartelized firms
over time. An exemption is made with those firms that started participating in a collusive
agreement in 1995 and 1996. Given that the sample starts in 1992, the matching for these firms
was made three and four years before the start of the treatment, respectively4. Moreover, since
the matching should be done on pre-treatment characteristics, I exclude from the analysis those
cartel cases that started before 1995.
In particular, I apply the non-parametric nearest neighbor matching method. I follow Imbens
and Wooldridge (2009) to define the algorithm. Let Yi denote the outcome of interest, let Xi be
the observable characteristics on which we are matching and let Ci be the treatment variable.
Given a sample {Yi, Xi, Ci}Ni=1, let `1(i) be the nearest neighbor to i, that is:
`1(i) = j, for j ∈ {1, ..., N}, if Cj 6= Ci, and ||Xj −Xi||= min
k:Ck 6=Ci
||Xk −Xi||
where the metric used is the Mahalanobis metric, which is based on the inverse of the full sample
variance-covariance matrix and is the most common in the literature. In addition, I have used
the option exact in Stata for one of the characteristics. Following Abadie et al. (2004), this
option allows to specify exact, or as exact as possible, matching on one or more variables. In
practice, it multiplies the corresponding elements in the weight matrix by 1,000 relative to the
weights placed on the other variables; and in this case, the inverse sample standard errors are
2More information can be found in the Appendix A.2.
3I have also performed two other matchings: three years before the treatment and in the first year of the
sample (1992). However, the match is especially not accurate in the second case.
4There are 2 cartel cases in 1995, which involve four firms; and 1 cartel case in 1996, which involves 3 firms.
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used for the variables specified in exact.
The observable characteristics used for the matching are based on the firms’ financial condi-
tions that have been found to predict cartel participation in the literature. I follow Bertrand,
Lumineau and Fedorova (2014), who find that firms with relatively larger market share are more
likely to participate in cartels while firms with high liquidity ratio are less likely to participate
in cartels. They do also find that relatively older firms tend to participate more in cartels and
that firm’s size is positively related to the likelihood of participating in a cartel, although this
effect varies with industry concentration.
In this case, I match cartelized and non-cartelized firms on the following observable charac-
teristics: age, indebtedness (or debt ratio), the ratio of long-term debt over total assets, leverage,
sector (at two digits level), costs of employees, the ratio of costs of employee over operating rev-
enues, the solvency ratio and total assets. This last variable was used in the exact option, which
means that the size of the firm is the most relevant variable when looking for a good control.
While total assets account for firm’s size and are related to profitability, the long-term debt
over assets controls for the loans and financial obligations lasting over one year with respect to
the firms’ assets. In addition, I use two different measures of the company’s leverage. On the
one hand, the debt ratio (or indebtedness) compares a company’s total debt to its total assets.
On the other hand, leverage is the level of a company’s debt related to is equity capital and is
expressed in percentage form. It shows the extent to which its operations are funded by lenders
versus shareholders. Finally, I use two measures of personnel expenses, which are costs of em-
ployees and the ratio of costs of employee over operating revenues, measured in levels and in
percentage, respectively. Symeonidis (2008) finds no evidence of any effect of collusion on wages,
while he shows that there exists a negative effect of collusion on labor productivity growth. For
this reason, I look for a firm in the control group that has similar costs of employees than the
cartelized firm before the treatment in order to control for firm’s efficiency.
Table 3 shows the t-test of mean equality for the matching variables5 in the whole pre-
treatment period. The equality of means shown in the table are never rejected if they are
computed year by year in the pretreatment period. The variable sector was not included in
Table 3 because the digits of the sector6 have no economic interpretation.
With respect to the outcome variables of interest, I want to study the effect of cartelization
on firms’ profitability. Therefore, I focus the analysis on three main variables: Operating Rev-
enues, Net Income and Profit Margin. Note that since the variable Operating Revenues only
5The summary statistics are presented in Table A.3. in the Appendix.
6It can be seen in Table A.1 in the Appendix how sectors are represented in the matched sample.
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Table 2.3: T-test of mean equality.
Variable Non-cartelized Cartelized Difference p-value N
Age 25.81 (0.83) 25.59 (0.85) 0.22 0.85 972
Total Assets 67978.92 (6705.87) 76733.87 (8984.51) -8754.94 0.44 926
Indebtedness 67.08 (0.90) 67.21 (0.90) -0.13 0.92 926
Long-term Debt/assets 0.12 (0.01) 0.10 (0.004) 0.02 0.05 884
Costs of Employees 7214.04 (585.42) 6685.40 (511.96) 528.64 0.50 926
Costs of Employees/Operating Revenues 13.88 (0.58) 15.70 (0.61) -1.83 0.03 926
Solvency Ratio 1.37 (0.04) 1.28 (0.03) 0.09 0.05 926
Leverage 147.74 (35.64) 123.97 (7.15) 23.77 0.50 926
Note: Standard deviation in brackets.
takes on positive values, I can normalize this variable and work with the logarithm of it. Given
that the distribution of firms’ revenues is very skewed, this transformation will help making the
relationship between the treatment variable and the outcome variable more linear. It also allows
interpretin the coefficient of interest in percentage terms (as an elasticity). Table 4 presents the
summary statistics of the treatment variable and the outcomes of interest.
Table 2.4: Summary statistics.
Period Variable Non-Cartelized CartelizedObs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pre-treatment
Cartelized 481 0 - 0 0 491 1 - 1 1
Operating Revenues 453 61743.4 88091.37 215.02 545822 473 105570.1 415633.7 198.6 4707617
Log of Operating Revenues 453 10.34 1.16 5.37 13.21 473 10.29 1.35 5.29 15.36
Profit Margin 453 3.47 11.49 -159.92 34.45 473 6.29 49.58 -632.742 686.39
Net income 453 1990.74 7523.92 -56906.64 47620 473 2127.31 7253.92 -32874 57282
Treatment
Cartelized 492 0 - 0 0 492 1 - 1 1
Operating Revenues 421 81524.1 148819.4 4248.63 954321 467 128473.3 293007.4 4048.038 4699735
Log of Operating Revenues 421 10.57 1.07 8.35 13.77 467 10.80 1.26 8.31 15.36
Profit Margin 421 4.28 10.27 -50.69 115.43 467 5.13 58.84 -919.43 652.61
Net income 421 1893.08 6864.07 -39713 47049 467 5729.42 20794.23 -81413 146205
Note: Profit Margin is expressed in percentage. Operating Revenues and Net Income are expressed in thousand euros.
The Operating Revenues are the revenues generated from a company’s business activity,
which means revenues posted from selling the company’s products and services. It allows study-
ing the effect of cartelization of firms’ revenues. The second measure considered is a profitability
ratio, the Profit Margin, which is calculated as net income divided by revenue or net profits di-
vided by sales. This variable is expressed in percentage and it measures how much out of every
dollar of sales a company actually keeps in earnings. The third variable of interest, Net Income,
reflects the company’s total earnings. It is calculated by taking revenues and subtracting the
costs of doing business such as depreciation, interest, taxes and other expenses. This variable
is considered to be an important measure of how profitable the company is over a period of time.
2.3.2 Difference-in-Differences Estimator
As pointed out above, I apply the difference-in-differences estimator in order to obtain the
causal effect of interest. This method allows to control for unobserved differences between treated
and control observations and for common shocks through the variables cartelized and period. In
particular, I run the following regression on the constructed matched sample:
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Yit = β0 + β1Cartelizedi + β2Periodt + β3Cartelizedi ∗ Periodt + αi + δt + uit (2.1)
where Yit is the outcome of interest described in the previous section; Cartelizedi takes
value 1 if the firm has ever been cartelized in the sample period and 0 otherwise; Periodt takes
value 1 the years in which the treatment took place and 0 before; Cartelizedi ∗ Periodt is the
interaction of the previous two dichotomous variables, so it takes value 1 for the cartelized firm
during the period in which it was cartelized and 0 before; αi represents individual fixed effects;
δt represents time fixed effects; and uit is the error term. Note that the variable Periodt takes
value 1 for the non-cartelized firm whenever it takes value 1 for its match in the treatment group7.
The coefficient of interest is β3, which tells how much more cartelized firms earned during the
period of cartelization compared to the non-cartelized ones. Thus, it gives the average treatment
effect of the treated. The estimation of β3 by OLS from the matched panel data sample is going
to be the baseline specification, which is equivalent to fixed effects (FE) estimator for panel data
when individual and time fixed effects are included in the regression. I also estimate the random
effects (RE) estimator and the random-effects linear model with an AR(1) disturbance (AR(1)).
This last model uses the generalized least-squares method to estimate the parameters in a linear
regression model in which the errors are serially correlated - the errors are assumed to follow a
first-order autoregressive process.
Since firms start and stop participating in a cartel at different moments in time, we can
consider the period 0 as the year in which they become a member of a cartel. Given the way I
have constructed the matched sample, meaning five years before the treatment, in most of the
cases I will have information for five periods before the treatment takes place (this would be up
to distance −5 from period 0), except for those two first years in which the matching was made
three and four years before the treatment. Similarly, each additional year in which the firm is
still cartelized will show up, and the maximum distance from treatment that could be found in
the sample is 138. This distance from treatment determines the different divisions of the sample
that I use in the estimations.
The basic identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences estimator is that the trends
in the two groups are the same in the absence of intervention. As mentioned above, the matching
has been performed five periods before the treatment starts. Despite having showed that the
variables used in the matching are on average equal for the treatment and control group in each
7In order to cluster the standard errors by cartel, all the matches of the firms that belong to a given cartel
are treated as if they would have formed another cartel themselves had they been cartelized. Therefore, apart
from having pairs of treated and control firms, I have an artificial control cartel for each existing cartel when it
comes to standard errors.
8There are only three firms that lasted up to 15 periods in a cartel, but they are outliers in terms of the
outcome variable. Therefore, they are excluded from the estimation sample, so that outliers do not drive these
results.
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of the pre-treatment period, it still remains to test whether the outcome variables of interest
follow parallel trends in the two groups. Figure 1 represents the average logarithm of operating
revenues and the average net income for cartelized and non-cartelized firms. It can be seen that
these outcomes follow similar patterns before the treatment starts, and then evolve differently
over time.
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Note: The dot line indicates the first period in which treatment takes place. This graph repre-
sents the average outcome variable for the treated and control group.
Additionally, I perform two different tests. First, I test for the equality of average changes in
the treatment and control group before the treatment following Galiani, Gertler and Schargros-
dky (2005). Secondly, I test if there exists any difference in time patterns before the treatment
takes place.
For the test of parallel trends, I consider only the pre-treatment period for cartelized firms
while the observations of the control group are considered for the whole period. I estimate
the fully saturated model and test for equality of the relevant coefficients. Tests are performed
for the different outcome variables of interest and for the different samples considered in the
regressions. Results are shown in Table A.4 in the Appendix. In most of the cases we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the trends of the treatment and control group are the same in
the pretreatment period at the 10% and 5% significance level. The same applies for the trends
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of non-cartelized firms before and after the treatment, and equality of trend of cartelized before
the treatment and non-cartelized before and after the treatment.
When the trends of the series can be better approximated by a non-linear function, there
exists an alternative way to test the pattern in each of the periods before the cartelization
takes place. Using again the sample of cartelized firms in the pretreatment period and the non-
cartelized firms in the whole period, I estimate a regression that contains a dummy for each
pre-treatment period for each treatment group. In this case, there exist differences in the levels
of the outcome variables between cartelized and non-cartelized firms. However, what matters
for the difference-in-differences models is that this difference in levels is constant over time in
the pretreatment period. Therefore, the tests performed study whether the difference between
cartelized and non-cartelized firms is the same in two or more periods. The null hypotheses of
the tests and the corresponding results are presented in Table A.5 in the Appendix. Given that
there exist many possible combinations, I tested the differences in consecutive periods from five
years before the treatment up to one period before, and also all of them together. In most of
the cases it cannot be rejected the hypothesis that the difference in the levels of the outcome
variables of cartelized and non-cartelized firms is constant in the pre-treatment period.
2.4 Results
Given that I am interested in the overall profitability of cartelization, the main results are
the ones coming from the full sample. Thus, the first sample (denoted as Overall Effect) con-
tains all the observations, meaning the cartelized firms and their pair from the control group
from distance −5 until distance 13. Secondly, since many of the cartel cases break up after a
few years, after distance two I start observing an important decrease in the number of treated
observations (and consequently in the control group counterpart). Table 2 shows that the av-
erage duration of cartels is around 3 years in the full sample. Therefore, the second sample
of interest (Short-term Effect) contains all the observations from distance −5 until distance 2,
which again means from five years before the treatment and up to three years of treatment.
This will allow me to examine whether there exists a significant short-term impact of carteliza-
tion on profits. Additionally, I am interested in studying whether the effect of cartelization
on firms’ profits is different for those cartels that do not last long and for those that last for
many years. Since the maximum distance from treatment is 13, I have considered two groups:
1) the first one is composed only by those firms that were in a cartel up to 7 periods or less
(Short-lived cartels, from distance −5 until distance 7); 2) the second group considers only firms
that were cartelized more than 7 periods (Long-lived cartels, from distance −5 until distance 13).
This section presents the results obtained from the different estimations. First, the main
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results corresponding to the overall treatment effect and the short-term effect of cartelization on
firms’ profits will be analyzed. Then, the results by cartel duration are considered.
2.4.1 Main Results
Table 5 summarizes the results of the difference-in-differences estimator for the samples cor-
responding to the estimation of the overall effect and the short-term effect. Firstly, results show
that being a member of a cartel has a positive and significant overall impact on revenues. The
operating revenues of the cartelized firms are around 19% − 26% higher than the operating
revenues of the non-cartelized firms during the period of cartelization. This effect on firms’
revenues is also present in the short-run, although it is lower. In the first three years of cartel
membership, firms manage to increase their revenues by 14% − 17% compared to what they
would have obtained if they had not been cartelized.
Table 2.5: Log of Operating Revenues. Diff-in-diff coefficient (β3).
Sample OLS FE RE AR(1)
Overall Effect 0.26** 0.26** 0.26** 0.19***(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.05)
N 1814 1814 1814 1814
R2 0.888 0.406 0.888 0.886
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Short-term Effect 0.17** 0.17** 0.17** 0.14***(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
N 1368 1368 1368 1368
R2 0.905 0.268 0.905 0.904
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard
errors by cartel in brackets.
Other measures of profitability such as Net Income and Profit Margin are not significantly
affected by the cartelization. This is, neither the overall nor the short-term impacts are sig-
nificantly different compared to the non-cartelized firms. Results are shown in Table A.6a and
Table A.6b in the Appendix.
Thus, the first important result is that cartelization increases firms’ revenues by 19%− 26%
on average, but this is not translated into profits or earnings. This result may reflect the fact
that managers are the ones making the decision of colluding or not. If their reputation or salary
bonuses are based on the performance of the firm, which can be measured with firms’ sales, then
getting involved in a cartel may be beneficial for their own interests. However, these personal
interests may not always be aligned with shareholders’ interests.
It should be noted that one of the limitations of the work is that the firms I am considering
as non-cartelized, could have been involved in a collusive agreement that was never discovered.
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If it was the case, results may be biased downwards and the total effect of cartelization may be
higher when compared to truly non-cartelized firms. Additionally, since results show a positive
and significant effect on the treatment group compared to the control group, then they may be
reflecting the fact that the discovered are cartels were more successful in terms of revenues than
the existing and not discovered ones.
On the other hand, another possible limitation of the data is that the firms of the control
group, even if they have never belonged to a collusive agreement, they could benefit or free-ride
from the reduced competition in the market. Or they could be harmed if the collusive firms try
to expel them from the market. If this was the case, then the treatment would not be being
cartelized versus not being cartelized but participating in a collusive agreement versus not par-
ticipating, given the existence of collusion in the market. Thus, in that setting results should
be interpreted as how much more do firms benefit from directly participating in the collusive
agreement compared to the rest. However, this scenario does not seem to be the most plausible
in the matched sample. I have estimated a simple OLS regression on the control group to test
the existence of a different trend before and during the period of treatment. The null hypothesis
of equality of coefficients cannot be rejected at standard significance levels.
2.4.2 Short-lived and Long-lived cartels
A second interesting result is found when the sample is split in two, distinguishing between
firms that belonged to cartels that lasted long enough and those that lasted less. From Table
6, it can be seen that firms that colluded for seven periods at most, manage to increase their
revenues by 13% − 15% on average. However, no significant impact is found on Net Income.
Similarly, Table 7 presents the results for the firms belonging to long-lived cartels. These firms
had on average 29% − 50% higher revenues than what they should have got if they had not
been cartelized. Additionally, cartelization also had a positive and significant impact on the Net
Income of these firms. Due to cartelization, they gained on average 7939-8811 thousand euros
more than they should have. This increased quantity is more than two times higher than the
average profits they would have earned if they had not been cartelized. Again, Profit Margin is
not significantly affected in any of the cases.
The second conclusion that can be extracted from the results is that cartelization always
increases firms’ revenues on average, but there exists a difference in the effects on profits. Two
alternative scenarios are possible. On the one hand, it may be that both types of cartels are
similar from the beginning in terms of profitability, but being cartelized long enough is the only
way to turn the increase in revenues into profits gains (organizational costs are reduced, for in-
stance). On the other hand, the causality could go in the opposite direction, meaning that some
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Table 2.6: Short-lived Cartels. Diff-in-diff coefficient (β3).
Sample OLS FE RE AR(1)
Log of Op. Revenues 0.15* 0.15* 0.15* 0.13**(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06)
N 1201 1201 1201 1201
R2 0.896 0.211 0.896 0.896
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Net Income -445.97 -445.97 -445.97 -535.74(729.27) (678.85) (729.27) (1000.42)
N 1201 1201 1201 1201
R2 0.398 0.058 0.398 0.398
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard errors
by cartel in brackets.
Table 2.7: Long-lived Cartels. Diff-in-diff coefficient (β3).
Sample OLS FE RE AR(1)
Log of Op. Revenues 0.50* 0.50** 0.50** 0.29***(0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.11)
N 514 514 514 514
R2 0.876 0.530 0.876 0.871
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Net Income 8811.16* 8811.16* 8811.16** 7939.08***(4011.20) (3883.04) (4011.20) (2632.21)
N 514 514 514 514
R2 0.639 0.097 0.639 0.639
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard errors
by cartel in brackets.
cartels are more profitable than others from the very beginning and this is one of the reasons
why they last longer. These two competing ideas are studied in the next section.
Evolution of Revenues and Profits
In this section, I analyze the evolution of revenues and profits period by period for short-lived
and long-lived cartels separately. In Figure 2 and 3 we can observe some suggestive evidence that
the amount of revenues and profits that cartelized firms earn, in comparison with non-cartelized
firms, may be different since the first period of treatment for the two different cartel durations.
However, these results should be interpreted carefully for two reasons. First of all, the sam-
ple contains 99 cartelized and 97 non-cartelized firms. Therefore, when the sample is split in
two, according to cartel duration, the number of firms in each group is smaller. There are 80
cartelized firms that belonged to a short-lived cartel, and 16 cartelized firms that belonged to a
long-lived cartel. The second reason is that firms drop out of the sample when they abandon the
cartel or when the cartel dies - whatever happens first. Therefore, while in the short-lived cartels
observations drop from period 1 onwards, the observations of long-lived cartels start dropping
after period 7.
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In order to analyze the evolution of revenues and profits thoroughly, I perform two different
tests. Pooling all the observations in the same regression, I test whether the overall impact of
cartelization on firms’ profitability is different for short-lived and long-lived cartels. In addition,
I test whether there exists any difference in the revenues and profits earned by cartelized firms,
compared to what the non-cartelized firms earned in the cartelization period, between the short-
lived and long-lived cartels. For this last test, I have considered both a dummy variable for each
period and another dummy variable that considers the cumulative effect up to the given period.
Table 2.8: Test equality of diff-in-diff coefficient (β3) across regression. Log of
Operating Revenues.
Diff-in-diff (β3) Distance
Short Long Short Long
Chi2 p-valCoeff Std. Err. Coeff Std. Err. N N
Cumulative
0-1 0.12 (0.07) 0.37* (0.18) 1002 220 2.27 0.13
0-2 0.11 (0.08) 0.36* (0.18) 1074 250 2.13 0.14
0-3 0.13 (0.08) 0.35* (0.18) 1114 281 1.88 0.17
0-4 0.14 (0.08) 0.35* (0.19) 1148 312 1.68 0.20
0-5 0.15* (0.08) 0.36* (0.19) 1177 343 1.69 0.19
0-6 0.15* (0.09) 0.38* (0.19) 1195 373 1.66 0.20
0-7 0.15* (0.09) 0.40* (0.20) 1201 401 1.81 0.18
All 0.15* (0.09) 0.50* (0.23) 1201 514 2.96 0.09
Dummy
0 0.13 (0.08) 0.35* (0.18) 1201 514 1.67 0.20
1 0.17 (0.12) 0.37* (0.18) 1201 514 1.32 0.25
2 0.05 (0.10) 0.35* (0.19) 1201 514 3.00 0.08
3 0.24 (0.20) 0.35* (0.18) 1201 514 0.28 0.59
4 0.20 (0.19) 0.39* (0.21) 1201 514 0.66 0.42
5 0.27 (0.22) 0.43** (0.19) 1201 514 0.41 0.52
6 0.28 (0.29) 0.45* (0.24) 1201 514 0.26 0.61
7 -0.04 (0.30) 0.53* (0.26) 1201 514 2.36 0.12
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard errors by cartel in brackets.
Fixed effects for Firm and Year have been included in the regression
Results are presented in Table 8 and in Table 9. From these regressions and tests, it can
be concluded that the overall impact of cartelization on profitability is different for short-lived
and long-lived cartels, on average. With respect to results by period, there exists some evidence
pointing at the existence of differences between the cartels duration since the first period. This
evidence is stronger when the cumulative effect is considered.
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Table 2.9: Test equality of diff-in-diff coefficient (β3) across regression. Net Income.
Diff-in-diff (β3) Distance
Short Long Short Long Chi2 p-valCoeff Std. Err. Coeff Std. Err. N N
Cumulative
0-1 -1030.05 (853.76) 2328.28 (1852.53) 1002 220 3.59 0.06
0-2 -724.53 (840.69) 2828.33 (1662.59) 1074 250 4.77 0.03
0-3 -579.12 (768.77) 3607.94* (1767.05) 1114 281 6.06 0.01
0-4 -585.52 (751.18) 4266.67* (2088.63) 1148 312 6.17 0.01
0-5 -503.94 (735.13) 4848.70* (2422.50) 1177 343 5.66 0.02
0-6 -440.79 (736.40) 5001.67* (2462.66) 1195 373 5.54 0.02
0-7 -445.97 (729.27) 5458.09* (2853.70) 1201 401 4.92 0.03
All -445.97 (729.27) 8811.16* (4011.20) 1201 514 6.14 0.01
Dummy
0 -2912.03 (2367.11) 1331.12 (1536.26) 1201 514 3.06 0.08
1 1035.56 (1834.12) 3751.56 (2452.01) 1201 514 0.87 0.35
2 97.76 (1941.46) 3925.34* (1855.86) 1201 514 2.39 0.12
3 970.04 (1425.35) 5149.00* (2501.66) 1201 514 2.52 0.11
4 108.79 (1066.12) 6984.77* (3259.35) 1201 514 5.19 0.02
5 2264.28 (2364.01) 7558.13* (4000.49) 1201 514 1.43 0.23
6 2917.78 (5367.53) 5823.51* (2819.80) 1201 514 0.25 0.62
7 -449.93 (1145.31) 9241.60 (5703.33) 1201 514 3.09 0.08
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard errors by cartel in brackets.
Fixed effects for Firm and Year have been included in the regression
Sensitivity Analysis
In order to analyze how qualitative and quantitative results depend on the cartel duration
used to split the sample in two, a sensitivity analysis is performed. The maximum cartel dura-
tion determining how the sample is split in two parts, varies successively, starting by comparing
cartels lasting up to one year or between 2 and 13 years (first row of Table 10), until the maxi-
mum duration is exhausted.
Table 2.10: Log of Operating Revenues. Diff-in-diff coefficient β3).
Duration RE AR(1) N Duration RE AR(1) N(up to) Coeff Std. Err. Coeff Std. Err. (from) Coeff Std. Err. Coeff Std. Err.
1 0.17* (0.10) 0.15 (0.11) 473 2-13 0.28** (0.14) 0.17*** (0.06) 1242
2 0.12 (0.10) 0.11 (0.08) 726 3-13 0.33** (0.16) 0.20*** (0.07) 989
3 0.16 (0.12) 0.14* (0.08) 807 4-13 0.32** (0.15) 0.18*** (0.07) 908
4 0.15 (0.11) 0.13* (0.07) 847 5-13 0.35** (0.16) 0.19*** (0.07) 868
5 0.12 (0.10) 0.11* (0.06) 970 6-13 0.41** (0.18) 0.23*** (0.09) 745
6 0.16* (0.09) 0.14** (0.06) 1123 7-13 0.43** (0.21) 0.24** (0.10) 592
7 0.15* (0.09) 0.13** (0.06) 1201 8-13 0.50** (0.23) 0.29*** (0.11) 514
8 0.13* (0.08) 0.11** (0.05) 1317 9-13 0.69*** (0.17) 0.43*** (0.14) 398
9 0.12 (0.08) 0.10* (0.05) 1347 10-13 0.79*** (0.16) 0.51*** (0.15) 368
10 0.12 (0.08) 0.10** (0.05) 1371 11-13 0.82*** (0.16) 0.53*** (0.16) 344
11 0.11 (0.08) 0.10* (0.05) 1404 12-13 0.96*** (0.13) 0.62*** (0.18) 311
12 0.14* (0.08) 0.12** (0.05) 1440 13 0.91*** (0.04) 0.52*** (0.15) 275
13 0.25** (0.12) 0.18*** (0.05) 1715
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard errors by cartel in brackets. Fixed effects for
Firm and Year have been included in the regression.
Results are shown in Table 10 for the variable Log of Operating Revenue, and in Table 11
for the variable Net Income. These tables show that cartels lasting short do not manage to in-
crease their revenues nor profits significantly, while the reverse happens for cartels lasting long.
Therefore, qualitative results do not depend on the cartel duration chosen to split the sample.
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Table 2.11: Net Income. Diff-in-diff coefficient β3).
Duration RE AR(1) N Duration RE AR(1) N(up to) Coeff Std. Err. Coeff Std. Err. (from) Coeff Std. Err. Coeff Std. Err.
1 -932.8 (1088.24) -885.97 (1538.71) 473 2-13 3277.46* (1885.39) 3022.47** (1250.08) 1242
2 -201.03 (1220.47) -502.1 (1682.68) 726 3-13 3826.90* (2273.50) 3070.53** (1444.18) 989
3 -199.65 (1063.29) -453.73 (1491.98) 807 4-13 4225.8 (2603.67) 3512.70** (1578.52) 908
4 -315 (987.37) -547 (1420.22) 847 5-13 4534* (2696.29) 3716.38** (1650.20) 868
5 -98.13 (846.96) -316.2 (1226.97) 970 6-13 5166.89* (3077.56) 4305.99** (1936.08) 745
6 -115.95 (763.83) -243.4 (1075.42) 1123 7-13 6838.74* (3853.31) 6102.55*** (2300.29) 592
7 -445.97 (729.27) -535.74 (1000.42) 1201 8-13 8811.16** (4011.20) 7939.08*** (2632.21) 514
8 -431.68 (732.93) -501.28 (908.56) 1317 9-13 11915.37*** (3121.50) 10943.78*** (3420.65) 398
9 -421.23 (710.28) -489.26 (887.12) 1347 10-13 13068.67*** (2753.76) 12038.63*** (3701.22) 368
10 -457.03 (697.91) -522.77 (871.45) 1371 11-13 14196.79*** (2305.03) 13090.95*** (3937.37) 344
11 -456.14 (674.81) -519.55 (850.16) 1404 12-13 15908.83*** (1171.60) 14753.78*** (4327.47) 311
12 -206.45 (754.32) -263.41 (832.33) 1440 13 16702.11*** (832.88) 15562.35*** (4855.59) 275
13 2350.26 (1685.43) 2065.55** (1026.82) 1715
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard errors by cartel in brackets. Fixed effects for Firm and Year have
been included in the regression.
2.4.3 Leniency Program
One of the main policies at the disposal of Antitrust Authorities aiming at detecting and
sanctioning cartels is the Leniency Program. This policy offers companies involved in a cartel
either total immunity from fines or fines reduction if they self-report the existence of the cartel
or if they cooperate with the Authority. The Leniency Program also aims at deterring cartel
formation by destabilizing the trust among cartel members. The controversial effects of this
policy have been studied in the literature. In Spain, the Leniency Program was passed in 2007
and implemented since 2008.
In this section, I analyze whether there exists any difference between the profitability of
cartels that applied for Leniency Program and those that were discovered due to any other rea-
son. This analysis is relevant because it helps us studying whether this program incentivizes the
breakup and discovery of all types of cartels, or only of those that are not profitable and would
have broken up anyway.
There are 18 cartelized firms that were members of a cartel that was discovered under the
Leniency Program, while 81 cartelized firms belonged to a cartel in which no member applied
for the Leniency Program. The last cartelization year of the firms belonging to a collusive agree-
ment that was not discovered under the program was 2007 or afterwards. This means that by
the time most of these firms stopped colluding they were aware of the existence of this law.
Therefore, it is not the case that these cartels could not apply for the Leniency Program (due
to time restrictions) but the case in which the members decided not to apply for it.
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Table 2.12: Log of Operating Revenues. Diff-in-diff coefficient (β3).
Sample OLS FE RE AR(1)
Leniency 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)
N 386 386 386 386
R2 0.882 0.458 0.882 0.880
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
No Leniency 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.24***(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.06)
N 1428 1428 1428 1428
R2 0.891 0.405 0.891 0.889
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard
errors by cartel in brackets.
Following the previous econometric strategy, I first analyze the effect of cartelization on firms’
revenues and profits, distinguishing between these two types of detection. Results are shown
in Table 12 and 13. The main conclusion that can be drawn is that cartels that did not apply
for the Leniency Program benefited from an increase in revenues, compared to non-cartelized
firms, while those cartels that applied for Leniency Program did not experience this increase.
The evidence is weaker when the outcome variable Net Income is considered, as shown in Table
13. A question left for further research (and further data availability) is whether there exists
a difference in cartel profitability in comparison to cartels finalized and discovered before the
implementation of the Leniency Program. This is, whether the mere existence of the program
(even if not all cartels apply for it) has some deterrence impact with respect to cartel profitability.
Table 2.13: Net Income. Diff-in-diff coefficient (β3).
Sample OLS FE RE AR(1)
Leniency -1014.74 -1014.74 -1014.74 -1561.73(1597.01) (1520.59) (1597.01) (1455.09)
N 386 386 386 386
R2 0.383 0.126 0.383 0.375
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
No Leniency 2910.79 2910.79 2910.79 2600.10**(1971.78) (1855.94) (1971.78) (1226.90)
N 1428 1428 1428 1428
R2 0.537 0.024 0.537 0.537
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard
errors by cartel in brackets.
Apart from the average impact of the treatment, the effect can also be analyzed period-by-
period. From Figure 4 and Figure 5, it cannot be concluded that cartelization had a different
impact on firms’ revenues and profits when they were or were not discovered under the Leniency
Program even though they seem to follow different patterns.
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The weak evidence appearing in the figures should be tested across regressions. Again, it
should also be taken into account the data limitations in terms of the number of observations.
Results are summarized in Table A.7a and Table A.7b in the Appendix. There is clear evidence
in Table A.7a of the existence of significant statistical differences in the revenues earned by the
firms belonging to cartels discovered under these two types of detection. In particular, for the
members of cartels applying for the Leniency Program, cartelization did not produce a signifi-
cant impact on revenues, while the effect of cartelization on revenues is significant when cartels
not applying for the program are considered. On the other hand the impact of cartelization on
firms’ profits is only significant in some late periods when the analysis is performed period by
period. However, Table A.7b shows that there exists a statistical significant difference between
the additional profits earned by the cartelized firms belonging to a cartel discovered under the
Leniency Program and the ones belonging to cartels discovered due to other reasons (always in
comparison with the control group).
2.5 Robustness Checks
In order to ensure that the effects found are due to the treatment, two different standard
placebo tests from the literature are performed. The first placebo test is performed in the
pre-treatment period to check whether some effect on firms’ profits can be observed before the
treatment takes place. The second placebo test replicates the estimations of interest in a sample
formed by the control group and a new match for each of the firms belonging to it.
2.5.1 Placebo Test in Pre-Treatment Period
The test is performed in the sample of cartelized and non-cartelized firms in the pre-treatment
period only. The following regression is estimated:
Yit = β0 + β1Cartelizedi + β2PeriodP lat + β3Cartelizedi ∗ PeriodP lat + αi + δt + uit (2.2)
where Yit is the outcome of interest ; Cartelizedi takes value 1 if the firm has ever been
cartelized in the sample period and 0 otherwise; PeriodP lat takes value 0 for distances to
treatment period −5 and −4, and takes value 1 for distances to treatment period −3 and −2;
Cartelizedi ∗ PeriodP lat is the interaction of the previous two dichotomous variables; αi rep-
resents individual fixed effects; δt represents time fixed effects; and uit is the error term. The
period previous to the start of the treatment (distance −1) has not been included in this regres-
sion because this date could be measured with error given that cartels are an illegal activity.
Given that the pre-treatment period is only composed by five periods, such a relevant period
54
could have an important weight and impact in the estimated coefficients9.
Table 2.14: Log of Operating Revenues. Diff-in-diff coefficient (β3).
Sample Placebo Pre-Treatment PeriodOLS FE RE AR(1)
All Cartels 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
N 750 750 750 750
R2 0.92 0.186 0.92 0.92
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Long-lived Cartels 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27(0.37) (0.32) (0.37) (0.19)
N 127 127 127 127
R2 0.889 0.254 0.889 0.889
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard
errors by cartel in brackets.
The results of the first placebo test are presented in Table 1410. It can be concluded that
cartelized firms do not behave differently from non-cartelized firms two and three periods before
the treatment starts compared to four and five periods before cartelization. Results for the
variable Net Income, presented in Table A.8a in the Appendix, are not significant either.
2.5.2 Placebo Test for Control Group
In this case, I work only with the non-cartelized firms. They are going to be the artificial
treatment group in the placebo test. Therefore, I treat them as if they were the cartelized firms
in the new sample I create. The period of treatment I use is the one that was artificially imputed
to them when they were used as control, therefore, the one that corresponds to the cartelized
firm for which they are the match. Thus, I can repeat the procedures explained in sections 3.2
and 3.3. For each of these non-cartelized firms, that are considered as treated in this case, I look
for a pair or control in the full sample of non-cartelized firms. Again, I apply the non-parametric
nearest neighbor matching method, and the observable characteristics used for the matching are
the same as before. After constructing the matched sample, I apply the difference-in-differences
estimator in order to check whether the coefficients of interest are significant in this case. More-
over, I test whether the outcomes of the treated and non-treated firms have parallel trends in
the pre-treatment period as it was done in section 5.1. It is also tested whether the non-treated
firms show different trends in their outcome variables for the pretreatment and treatment period.
9I have performed the placebo test also including also this period and the coefficients and its significance are
basically not affected.
10Results for short-lived cartels can be found in Table A.8b in the Appendix.
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Table 2.15: Log of Operating Revenues. Diff-in-diff coefficient (β3).
Sample OLS FE RE AR(1)
Overall Effect -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
N 1725 1725 1725 1725
R2 0.921 0.396 0.921 0.921
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Short-term Effect -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
N 1318 1318 1318 1318
R2 0.938 0.266 0.938 0.938
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard errors by
cartel in brackets.
The estimation results of the outcome variable logarithm of operating revenues for the over-
all and the short-term effects are presented in Table 1511. The placebo results of the analysis
for short-lived and long-lived cartels are summarized in Table 16 and Table 17. No significant
impact of cartelization on firms’ revenues or profits can be found in these placebo analyses. This
confirms that the main results obtained for cartelized and non-cartelized firms actually represent
the causal effect of being a member of a cartel on firms’ revenues or profits.
Table 2.16: Short-lived cartels. Diff-in-diff coefficient (β3).
Sample OLS FE RE AR(1)
Log of Op. Revenues -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
N 1132 1132 1132 1132
R2 0.923 0.206 0.923 0.923
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Net Income 707.18 707.18 707.18 920.81(869.48) (806.31) (869.48) (778.75)
N 1132 1132 1132 1132
R2 0.71 0.083 0.71 0.709
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard errors
by cartel in brackets.
11Results for the variable Net Income can be found in Table A.9 in the Appendix.
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Table 2.17: Long-lived cartels. Diff-in-diff coefficient (β3).
Sample OLS FE RE AR(1)
Log of Op. Revenues 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
N 501 501 501 501
R2 0.92 0.523 0.92 0.919
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Net Income -906.18 -906.18 -906.18 -899.64(841.74) (814.22) (841.74) (1060.59)
N 503 503 503 503
R2 0.333 0.084 0.333 0.333
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard errors
by cartel in brackets.
2.6 Conclusions
Cartels are considered one of the most serious infringements in competition policy. Fighting
against cartels and preventing their formation is not only one of the main tasks of the European
Commission but also of most of the National Competition Authorities. However, a precise mea-
sure of how much firms benefit from collusion is needed in order to design effective policies.
In this project, it has been analyzed and quantified the causal effect of having participated
in a collusive agreement on the revenues and profits earned by its members. The main object is
to understand how big are the incentives for firms to participate in a collusive agreement.
Despite the limitations originated from working with discovered cartels, this study contributes
in two aspects. First of all, I make use of a control group in order to be able to compare the
evolution of revenues and benefits of cartelized firms with a group of reference. The second
relevant contribution is that the problem of self-selection into treatment has been considered.
The construction of the control group is based on having cartelized and non-cartelized firms
similar in factors conductive to increase the likelihood of participating in a cartel. The control
group reflects as accurate as possible the potential evolution of the cartelized firms had they not
belonged to a cartel. In addition, the difference-in-differences estimator controls for unobserv-
able differences.
In order to study the impact of cartelization on firms’ revenues and profits, I use a panel data
of cartelized and non-cartelized Spanish firms for the period 1995-2014 coming from two different
sources. On the one hand, I use information provided by the reports of the 68 cartels that have
been sanctioned by the Spanish Antitrust Authority in the last two decades (1990-2014). On the
other hand, I have information of the balance sheet of Spanish firms since 1992 to 2014. This
data comes from the Iberian Balance sheet Analysis System (SABI).
Analyzing the two datasets together, I can distinguish which firms have participated in a
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collusive agreement (cartelized) from those that either have never participated in a cartel or
have not been discovered yet (non-cartelized). After creating a sample of interest that includes
cartelized and non-cartelized firms similar and comparable in observable characteristics (using
the Nearest Neighbor Matching Algorithm), I can compare the revenues and profits of these two
groups. Using the difference-in-differences estimator, it can be estimated the effect of carteliza-
tion of firms’ profitability.
Results show that firms’ revenues increase around 19%-26% due to participation in a collu-
sive agreement. However, profits measured as net income do not show a significant impact on
average. In the first three years of cartelization, which corresponds to the average cartel duration
in the full sample, firms increase their revenues by 14%-17%.
The most interesting results are found when the sample is divided into short-lived and long-
lived cartels. While the first ones only experience an increase in revenues, not only a significant
impact on revenues but also on profits is found on the latter. This is, firms that belong to a
long-lasting cartel increase their revenues by 29%-50%. Also, these revenues are translated into
profits since net income is, on average, 2.15-2.33 times higher than what these cartelized firms
would have earned if they had not been involved in a cartel case. These long-lived cartels appear
to be more profitable since initial periods. Finally, there exists some weak evidence that only
members of non-profitable cartels apply for the Leniency Program.
Summing up, it can be concluded that colluding is profitable in Spain, especially when the
collusive agreement lasts long enough. Additionally, the magnitude of this positive effect should
be considered when designing competition policies.
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Appendix 2.A
2.A.1 Distribution of Cartelized Firms by Sector
Table A.112 contains the representation of sectors both in the raw data and in the matched
sample.
Table 2.A.1: Cartelized firms by sector.
Total Sample Matched Sample
Sector Firms Freq. Firms Freq.
A 3 1.19 1 1.01
B 1 0.4 0 0.00
C 74 29.25 21 21.21
D 3 1.19 0 0.00
E 17 6.72 9 9.09
F 33 13.04 22 22.22
G 70 27.67 28 28.28
H 24 9.49 10 10.1
J 4 1.58 0 0.00
K 5 1.98 1 1.01
M 2 0.79 1 1.01
N 17 6.72 6 6.06
Total 253 100.00 99 100.00
2.A.2 Truncation
Before constructing the matched sample, I drop from the sample the outliers belonging to
the upper and lower tails of the distribution. The reason for doing this is that I may not be able
to find a good counterfactual for these observations. Since I am working with firms, an outlier in
terms of profits could drive the results of the estimation, and having a good counterfactual for
the cartelized firms is crucial for the validity of the results. Moreover, it is a common procedure
in the literature when working with firm-level data.
I proceed as follows. I look for the firms that have been, at least in one of the years (1992-
2014), below the 0.1% or above the 99.9% of the distribution of the following dependent variables:
Profit Margin, Net Income, Operating Revenues, Ebitda or Ebit. Once I have identified these
firms, I drop them from the sample. From the initial 21,514 firms, I end up with 20,757 firms in
the truncated sample. In Table 3, it can be seen the number of total different firms that have been
12Description of NACE Rev.2 Sector Classification by Section: A - Agriculture, forestry and fishing. B - Mining
and quarrying. C - Manufacturing. D - Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply. E - Water supply;
sewerage, waste management and remediation activities. F - Construction. G - Wholesale and retail trade; repair
of motor vehicles and motorcycles. H - Transportation and storage. J - Information and communication. K -
Financial and insurance activities. M - Professional, scientific and technical activities. N - Administrative and
support service activities.
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excluded from each distribution and the total number of different firms dropped from the sample.
Table 2.A.2: Truncation: Number of firms dropped.
Profit Net Operating Ebitda Ebit TotalMargin Income Revenues
< 0.01 > 99.9 < 0.01 > 99.9 < 0.01 > 99.9 < 0.01 > 99.9 < 0.01 > 99.9
#Firms 243 164 170 80 256 42 157 62 150 75 757
2.A.3 Matching Variables
The summary statistics of the observable characteristics used in the matching are presented
in Table A.3.
Table 2.A.3: Summary Statistics.
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Age 30.43 26 19.39 2 114 2581
Total Assets 104266.9 28394.69 247482.2 1014.06 2257771 2258
Indebtedness 63.84 65.3 22.16 3.64 225.1 2258
Long-term Debt/Assets 0.11 0.07 0.15 0 1.88 2056
Costs of Employees 12224.39 4121.25 36219.61 45.22 533103 2258
Costs of Employees/Operating Revenues 15.98 12.81 13.13 0.26 106.1 2258
Solvency Ratio 1.50 1.24 1.27 0.06 26.33 2258
Leverage 119.91 61.73 479.10 –10803.45 9227.825 2258
Note: Age is expressed in years. Total Assets and Costs of Employees are expressed in thousand euros.
The rest are expressed in percentage.
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2.A.4 Parallel Trends
The first step is to test whether the cartelized and non-cartelized firms have parallel trends
in their outcome variables before the treatment takes place. In this regression it is considered
only the pretreatment period for each cartelized firm while the observations of the control firms
are considered for the whole period. The following fully saturated model is estimated:
Yit = β1CBi + β2CBi ∗ Trendt + β3NCBi + β4NCBi ∗ Trendt + β5NCAi + β6NCAi ∗ Trendt + αi + δt + uit
where CBi is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for cartelized firms in the pretreatment pe-
riod and 0 otherwise; NCBi is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for non-cartelized firms
in the pretreatment period and 0 otherwise; NCAi is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for
non-cartelized firms in the treatment period and 0 otherwise; Trendt is a trend variable and
takes value 1 for distance −5 and increases in one unit for each distance until taking value 14
for distance 13; αi represents individual fixed effects; δt represents time fixed effects; and uit is
the error term.
Table 2.A.4: Test of Parallel Trends.




Overall Effect 3.60 0.06 0.12 0.73 3.24 0.05
Short-term Effect 4.08 0.05 0.02 0.90 2.27 0.11
Short-lived Cartels 1.68 0.20 0.96 0.33 2.51 0.09
Long-lived Cartels 1.51 0.24 1.21 0.30 1.50 0.27
Net Income
Overall Effect 0.66 0.42 0.30 0.58 0.33 0.72
Short-term Effect 0.62 0.43 1.83 0.18 0.93 0.40
Short-lived Cartels 0.53 0.47 1.88 0.18 0.94 0.40
Long-lived Cartels 1.81 0.21 4.04 0.07 2.22 0.16
Note: Fixed effects for Firm and Year have been included in the regression.
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2.A.5 Test Difference in Coefficients for each Distance
When the trends of the series can be better approximated by a non-linear function, there
exists an alternative way to test the pattern in each of the periods before the cartelization
takes place. Using again the sample of cartelized firms in the pretreatment period and the
non-cartelized firms in the whole period, I estimate the following equation:
Yit = β0 + β1CD5 + β2NCD5 + β3CD4 + β4NCD4 + β5CD3 + β6NCD3 + β7CD2 + β8NCD2 + β9CD1 + β10NCD1 + αi + δt + uit
where CD5 is a binary variable that takes value 1 for cartelized firms five periods before the
treatment and 0 otherwise; NCD5 is a binary variable that takes value 1 for non-cartelized
firms five periods before the treatment and 0 otherwise; the same reasoning applies for the rest
of the binary variables where the number denotes the number of periods before the treatment;
αi represents individual fixed effects; δt represents time fixed effects; and uit is the error term.
Table 2.A.5: Test of Constant Difference by Distance to Treatment.




Overall Effect 0.09 0.76 0.01 0.92 3.16 0.08 2.04 0.16 1.50 0.22
Short-term Effect 0.09 0.76 0.01 0.90 3.19 0.08 2.11 0.15 1.67 0.17
Short-lived Cartels 0.20 0.66 0.09 0.77 2.00 0.16 0.96 0.33 0.80 0.53
Long-lived Cartels 2.21 0.16 0.45 0.52 1.07 0.32 6.60 0.03 2.51 0.10
Net Income
Overall Effect 1.47 0.23 1.64 0.21 0.20 0.65 0.01 0.92 0.79 0.54
Short-term Effect 1.53 0.22 1.80 0.19 0.22 0.64 0.03 0.85 0.91 0.47
Short-lived Cartels 1.53 0.22 1.96 0.17 0.41 0.52 0.41 0.53 1.51 0.22
Long-lived Cartels 0.03 0.87 0.11 0.74 2.75 0.13 2.47 0.14 1.11 0.40
Note: Test of all differences: H0: β2-β1=β4-β3=β6-β5=β8-β7=β10-β9. Fixed effects for Firm and Year have been included in the regression.
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2.A.6 Estimation Results
The estimation results for the overall effect and the short-term effect of cartelization on Net
Income and Profit Margin are presented in Table A.6a and A.6b, respectively.
Table 2.A.6: Diff-in-diff coefficient (β3).
Table 2.A.6.A Net Income. Diff-in-diff coefficient (β3).
Sample OLS FE RE AR(1)
Overall Effect 1974.42 1974.42 1974.42 1657.29(1700.99) (1605.61) (1700.99) (1011.75)
N 1814 1814 1814 1814
R2 0.524 0.025 0.524 0.523
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Short-term Effect -48.26 -48.26 -48.26 -156.98(783.22) (724.18) (783.22) (883.29)
N 1368 1368 1368 1368
R2 0.453 0.016 0.453 0.453
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard
errors by cartel in brackets.
Table 2.A.6.B Profit Margin. Diff-in-diff coefficient (β3).
Sample OLS FE RE AR(1)
Overall Effect -2.04 -2.04 -2.04 -3.01(1.66) (1.56) (1.66) (4.84)
N 1814 1814 1814 1814
R2 0.097 0.015 0.097 0.096
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Short-term Effect -1.64 -1.64 -1.64 -2.93(2.49) (2.30) (2.49) (6.33)
N 1368 1368 1368 1368
R2 0.109 0.022 0.109 0.109
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard
errors by cartel in brackets.
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2.A.7 Evolution of Revenues and Profits by Leniency Program Application
The evolution period by period of the variables Log of Operating Revenues and Net Income
distinguishing by Leniency Program application are presented in Table A.7a and Table A.7b
respectively.
Table 2.A.7: Test equality of diff-in-diff coefficient (β3) across regression.
Table 2.A.7.A Test equality of diff-in-diff coefficient (β3) across regression. Log of
Operating Revenues.
Diff-in-diff (β3) Distance
Leniency No Leniency Len No Len Chi2 p-valCoeff Std. Err. Coeff Std. Err. N N
Cumulative
0-1 0.05 (0.12) 0.21 (0.08) 230 1030 1.63 0.20
0-2 0.01 (0.10) 0.22** (0.09) 259 1109 2.93 0.09
0-3 0.04 (0.09) 0.23** (0.09) 285 1160 2.86 0.09
0-4 0.04 (0.10) 0.25** (0.10) 312 1204 2.86 0.09
0-5 0.05 (0.11) 0.26** (0.10) 338 1243 2.69 0.10
0-6 0.07 (0.11) 0.27*** (0.10) 356 1278 2.14 0.14
0-7 0.06 (0.12) 0.29*** (0.10) 369 1304 2.48 0.11
0-8 0.06 (0.11) 0.30*** (0.10) 378 1328 2.80 0.09
All 0.06 (0.11) 0.33*** (0.12) 386 1428 3.03 0.08
Dummy
0 0.02 (0.20) 0.21** (0.08) 386 1428 0.97 0.33
1 -0.04 (0.17) 0.29** (0.11) 386 1428 3.27 0.07
2 -0.08 (0.13) 0.24* (0.12) 386 1428 3.94 0.05
3 0.16 (0.24) 0.37** (0.16) 386 1428 0.64 0.42
4 0.16 (0.26) 0.39*** (0.14) 386 1428 0.75 0.39
5 0.16 (0.27) 0.42*** (0.15) 386 1428 0.84 0.36
6 0.23 (0.32) 0.39** (0.15) 386 1428 0.24 0.62
7 0.02 (0.24) 0.55*** (0.15) 386 1428 4.43 0.04
8 0.11 (0.20) 0.53*** (0.17) 386 1428 2.92 0.09
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard errors by cartel in brackets.
Fixed effects for Firm and Year have been included in the regression
Table 2.A.7.B Test equality of diff-in-diff coefficient (β3) across regression. Net
Income.
Diff-in-diff (β3) Distance
Leniency No Leniency Len No Len
Chi2 p-valCoeff Std. Err. Coeff Std. Err. N N
Cumulative
0-1 -2918.27 (2105.80) 281.72 (818.34) 230 1030 2.72 0.10
0-2 -2276.99 (1641.20) 543.59 (848.54) 259 1109 3.05 0.08
0-3 -1821.29 (1347.64) 927.40 (864.63) 285 1160 3.75 0.05
0-4 -1846.41 (1301.47) 1246.96 (968.38) 312 1204 4.53 0.03
0-5 -1531.68 (1425.02) 1489.79 (1090.13) 338 1243 3.51 0.06
0-6 -1055.50 (1629.42) 1524.08 (1136.34) 356 1278 2.07 0.15
0-7 -1141.47 (1612.88) 1722.32 (1259.62) 369 1304 2.40 0.12
0-8 -1120.50 (1618.30) 1971.44 (1365.91) 378 1328 2.60 0.11
All -1014.74 (1597.01) 2910.79 (1971.78) 386 1428 2.85 0.09
Dummy
0 -5938.16 (4501.35) -1405.78 (2352.76) 386 1428 1.00 0.32
1 -2256.72 (1774.50) 2618.70 (1854.90) 386 1428 4.39 0.04
2 -739.24 (1945.17) 1486.09 (1819.64) 386 1428 0.85 0.36
3 530.67 (2946.15) 2672.41** (1296.18) 386 1428 0.55 0.46
4 -1681.08 (1581.55) 5373.86*** (1761.73) 386 1428 10.66 0.00
5 2446.32 (3812.26) 4908.06* (2575.98) 386 1428 0.35 0.55
6 5326.49 (7449.84) 2987.70 (2302.75) 386 1428 0.11 0.74
7 -838.04 (2333.42) 9299.08* (4856.97) 386 1428 4.19 0.04
8 -658.70 (1791.73) 10179.01** (4064.66) 386 1428 7.01 0.01
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard errors by cartel in brackets.
Fixed effects for Firm and Year have been included in the regression
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2.A.8 Placebo Test in the Pre-Treatment Period
The results of the placebo test in the pre-treatment period for the variable Net Income are
presented in Table A.8a. And the results for short-lived cartels are presented in Table A.8b.
Table 2.A.8: Diff-in-diff coefficient (β3).
Table 2.A.8.A Net Income. Diff-in-diff coefficient (β3).
Sample Placebo Pre-Treatment PeriodOLS FE RE AR(1)
All Cartels -370.77 -370.77 -370.77 -507.12(428.81) (366.91) (428.81) -785.85
N 750 750 750 750
R2 0.691 0.025 0.691 0.69
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Long-lived Cartels -325.09 -325.09 -325.09 -312.78(408.51) (351.30) (408.51) (941.31)
N 127 127 127 127
R2 0.871 0.026 0.871 0.871
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard
errors by cartel in brackets.
Table 2.A.8.B Short-lived cartels. Diff-in-diff coefficient (β3).
Sample OLS FE RE AR(1)
Log of Op. Revenues 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07)
N 603 603 603 603
R2 0.924 0.171 0.924 0.924
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Net Income -332.92 -332.92 -332.92 -527.66(526.13) (449.60) (526.13) (965.66)
N 603 603 603 603
R2 0.668 0.026 0.668 0.667
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard errors
by cartel in brackets.
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2.A.9 Placebo Test for Control Group (Net Income)
The results of the placebo test for the control group regarding the variable Net Income are
summarized in Table A.9.
Table 2.A.9: Net Income. Diff-in-diff coefficient (β3).
Sample OLS FE RE AR(1)
Overall Effect 210.63 210.63 210.63 358.28(662.64) (623.94) (662.24) -612.09
N 1727 1727 1727 1727
R2 0.635 0.055 0.635 0.635
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Short-term Effect 302.68 302.68 302.68 439.82(721.67) (665.77) (721.67) (614.39)
N 1320 1320 1320 1320
R2 0.729 0.052 0.729 0.729
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significance test. Cluster standard
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3.1 Introduction
Leniency programs have, in principle, destabilization and deterrence effects in the fight
against cartels (Motta and Polo, 2003; and Spagnolo, 2004), although some have raised con-
cerns that leniency programs may facilitate collusion if final expected fines turn smaller by
applying into the program and obtaining amnesty (Spagnolo, 2004). The later effect will also
be magnified if competition authorities reduce resources devoted to discovering cartels by their
own initiative or substitute away from other potential more effective policies such as positive
rewards to firms and individual informants (Aubert, Rey and Kovacic, 2006; and Harrington,
2008).
After the introduction of leniency programs, there is a surge in the number of discovered
cartels in most jurisdictions and then the rate of cartel discovered gradually levels down.
There are not, however, many contributions that try to identify and quantify how leniency
programs affect the amount of final fines and the duration and stability of cartels. There are
even some concerns (Chen and Harrington, 2007) that leniency facilitates the discovery of the
less stable cartels while it facilitates the coordination of the more stable cartels. Some suggest
that collusive prices turn to be higher, conditional on a cartel forming, when there is a leniency
program (Apesteguia et al., 2007; Hinloopen and Soetevent, 2008; Hamaguchia et al., 2009;
Dijkstra et al., 2011; and Bigoni et al., 2012).
The results of the empirical literature are very inconclusive. Brenner (2009) examines the
effectiveness and efficiency on the EU leniency program adopted in 1996. The critical issue is the
potential sample selection bias from only observing detected cartels. To solve this, the author,
following the existing literature, checks conditions on short and long-term changes of number
and duration of cartels and also examines whether cartels differ in observable dimensions before
and after the introduction of the leniency program.
Brener (2009) shows that the level of fine per firm is larger in the cases under leniency pro-
gram, and that the duration of the investigation decreases by 1.5 years (for the 61 cases of the
sample between 1990 and 2003). However, those effects are not properly identified using program
evaluation techniques. And, the paper was not able to show how leniency programs affect cartel
stability.
Klein (2010) uses the intensity of competition at the industry level of OECD countries. Es-
timating an instrumental variable approach, the results reveal a positive effect on industries’
competition intensity of leniency programs indicating effectiveness in cartel destabilization and
effective deterrence. And Zhou (2015) uses a dynamic model of cartel formation and dissolution
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to illustrate how changes in antitrust policies and market and macroeconomic conditions might
affect cartel duration.
Zhou (2015) shows that apparently cartels discovered just after the introduction of the le-
niency program have even larger durations than cartels discovered before the introduction of
leniency (short-run stability effect), but that gradually cartel durations of the discovered cartels
turn to be shorter than before the introduction of the leniency program (long-run destabilization
effect). The latter conclusion is also found in De (2010).
These results are consistent with the concerns raised by Chen and Harrington (2007) that
leniency in the long run facilitates the discovery of the less stable cartels. Note that De (2010)
uses cartel cases discovered by the European Commission too, but she has no control group and
she is not able to define the short-run properly. On the contrary, Zhou (2015) distinguishes
between short-run and long-run impact of the policy on cartels the same way we do it in this
paper: considering those cartels born before the implementation of the program and collapsed
after (short-run); and those that were formed and broken under the existence of the Leniency
Program. He uses data on cartel cases detected by the European Commission and the Division
of Justice (US). However, he is only able to study the impact of the Leniency Program imple-
mented in 1996 and modified in 2002, but he does not include the modification of 2006. In
addition, he is not able to study the long run effect of the policy on the cartel cases born and
dead after 2002 due to a lack, and he uses the American cases as a proxy of the European cases.
In this paper, we use a difference-in-differences program evaluation approach to identify and
quantify the impact of leniency programs on cartel duration, cartels’ final fines, and duration of
the investigation. We analyze the impact of leniency on a set of cartel cases discovered by the
European Commission and the Spanish Competition Authority since 1980 and 1990 respectively.
Leniency programs were introduced in two different moments of time: in 1996 in the EU (it was
modified later on in 2002 and 2006) and in 2008 in Spain. The key identifying assumption in this
paper is that the exact moment at which leniency programs are introduced is largely exogenous
as it depends on the political developments at the EU and Spanish level respectively.
These differences in the timing of the policy adoption allow us to separate out the changes in
the mean of cartel duration, cartel fines and investigation duration across jurisdiction (EU versus
Spain) and across time (before versus after), and once these effects are controlled for, we esti-
mate the impact of the differences-in-differences effect of the introduction of Leniency Programs.
Therefore, the contributions of this paper are several. First of all, we study the Leniency
Program implemented in EU in 1996, together with its modifications in 2002 and 2006; and the
one implemented in Spain in 2008. We exploit the geographic and time differences of this exoge-
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nous policy. Secondly, we allow for heterogeneous effects of the program in terms of short run
and long run impact, distinguishing between the observations partially treated by the program
(unexpected change in competition policy) and those fully treated (cartels born under the exis-
tence of the program). Finally, we carefully define our control group and our treatment group of
interest with respect to those cases that applied for the Leniency Program, those that benefited
from it by cooperating with the authority, and those that were affected by the policy even if they
don’t fall in any of the previous categories. In addition, we use a program evaluation technique
(difference-in-differences estimator) since we always work with a treatment and a control group,
where the latter is not only composed by the old cartel cases in that geographic area but also
includes those cases of the second region considered.
We show that leniency program has a clear cut and sharp effect on cartel stability: cartel
duration increases on the short run and decreases in the long run. We are able to separate
out the impact of leniency program on the cartels born before leniency and died after leniency
(short-run effect), and also the impact on the cartels born and died after leniency (long-run
effect). According to the theory (Harrington and Chang, 2009), the positive short run impact
on cartel duration and the negative impact in the long run show that the policy was effective in
terms of more aggressive detection and conviction, and results into fewer cartels forming due to
the program. Leniency has a clear and sharp destabilization short-run and long run effect, and
also a sharp and clear deterrence effect.
We are not able, however, to tackle the pending question of whether leniency promotes the
stability of hard-core cartels which both before and after leniency remain undiscovered.
With respect to the effect of the Leniency Program on cartels fines, we are not able to find
a significant impact, and we explain the possible reasons that could lead to this result. We are
able to find, on the contrary, a significant and negative impact of the program on the duration
of the investigation, which is decreased by around 0.8-1.3 years.
The paper organizes as follows. After this introduction, section 2 details the review of the
literature; section 3 shows the data collected for this paper on all cartels discovered since 1980 in
the EU, and since 1989 in Spain. It also details the methods of the diff-in-diff program evaluation
techniques used in the paper, and defines the groups of control cartels and the leniency treated
cartels. Section 4 shows the results of the program evaluation exercise and offers the magnitudes
of the impact of leniency programs on cartel duration, the amount of fines and investigation
duration. Finally, section 5 offers some concluding remarks, some policy implication, and some
discussion of the pending questions for further research.
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3.2 Literature Review
The academic literature on leniency programs has been developed in three main fields of
research: theoretical, experimental and empirical. The former includes the seminal papers by
Motta and Polo (2003) or Spagnolo (2004), who support the advantages of these destabilizing
instruments for cartels. Subsequent papers have focused on: the effect of leniency programs on
the behavior of firms (Aubert, Rey and Kovacic, 2006), who propose the use of these programs
complemented with bounties to individuals; to allow for the probability of discovery and suc-
cessful prosecution to change over time (Harrington, 2008); and many other improvements to
the general model by Fees and Walzl (2004), Motchenkova (2004), Chen and Harringon (2007),
Hinloopen and Soeteven (2008), Harrington and Chang (2009) and Sauvagnat (2012).
All these papers yield to the same general conclusion: leniency programs hinder collusion.
Experimental studies also find that leniency programs reduce cartel formation (Apesteguia et
al., 2007; Hinloopen and Soetevent, 2008; Hamaguchia et al., 2009; Dijkstra et al., 2011; and
Bigoni et al., 2012).
But our main related literature is that which studies empirically the effects of leniency pro-
grams. Miller (2009) and Brenner (2009) are the two seminal papers in this specific topic.
The former uses 207 cartels discovered in USA between 1985-2005 to evaluate whether leniency
entrance enhances detection and deterrence capabilities. His empirical strategy is based on
a Poisson regression model in order to estimate cartel discoveries as function of some control
variables as GDP, budget of Antitrust Authority (DOJ), fines, time and leniency program. He
concludes that the number of cartels discoveries peaks after the introduction of leniency and it
then falls to pre-entrance period.
Brenner (2009) studies how leniency programs affect (or not) three variables of interest: fines,
duration of investigation and the duration of detected cartels. Using data from 61 European
Union cases in the period 1990-2003, the author shows that the First EU Program Leniency
allowed to obtain higher fines and to reduce by 1.5 years the duration of the investigation. How-
ever, the hazard model does not accept the hypothesis of deterrence effect of the program.
De (2010) focuses on cartel duration on 110 EC cartels convicted in the period 1990-2008.
She employs a Cox-proportional hazard regression in order to test what factors affect cartel
breakdown. Her results expose that the structure of the cartel and the external disturbances
play an important role in cartels break up. However, she finds no significant result for the cartels
detected under the leniency program. Zhou (2015) study the impact of the Leniency Program
(1996 and 2002) on cartel duration using cartel cases discovered by the EC and the DoJ. He
analyses separately the short run and long run effects of the policy, but he does not use a diff-
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in-diff approach since he compares the EU treated cartels with the EU control group, and uses
the DoJ data as a proxy for the effect that the Leniency Program EU 2002 would have had on
the long run, due to data limitations.
In fact, Miller (2009) exposes some caveats about how cross-sectional variation could provide
more robust identification, using data from introduction of leniency programs across the world.
As commented above, we study the Leniency Program, exploiting the geographic and time
differences of this exogenous policy. We study the short run and long run impact of the policy
using a diff-in-diff approach in which we compare the cartel cases partially treated by the pro-
gram and those fully treated to the control group, respectively. We find a positive and significant
impact on cartel duration in the short run, and negative in the long run, which goes in line with
the previous literature (Harrington and Chang, 2009; Zhou, 2015). We do also find a negative
and significant impact on the duration of the investigation, as in Brenner (2009). We cannot
find, however, any significant impact on cartel fines that due to the program itself.
3.3 Data and Methods
We have collected the detailed information of all cartel decisions taken by the European
Commission between 1980 and 2015, and by the Spanish Competition Authority between 1995
and 2015. In total there have been 196 cartel decisions (129 cases in EU and 67 cases in Spain),
only 182 if we exclude 14 decisions involving only business associations but not actual firms (7
EU cases, and other 7 Spanish cases). There have been 89 decisions with leniency fine reductions
since the introduction of the leniency program in the EU in 1996 (60 cases with leniency), and
in Spain in 2008 (15 leniency cases).
Table 1 shows the basic descriptive statistics of the data collected by jurisdiction (EU/ Spain),
and also by the no leniency/leniency split. The figures of the cases under the Leniency Program
consider all cartels that benefited from it, had they applied for a lenient treatment or not. A de-
scription of the variables can be found in the appendix, and more in detail in Ordóñez-de-Haro,
Borrell and Jiménez (2018).
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Table 3.1: Average Statistics by Leniency Program and Geographic Area.
Variables EU (1980-2015) Spain (1989-2015)




Number of cases (all) 40 89 49 18
Number of cases (associations only excluded) 33 89 42 18
Basic amount of fines 117.3 (291.9) 322.3 (352.5)** 22.9 (35.1) 25.5 (27.2)
Fines before leniency 14.8 (17.8) 339.2 (410.6) 20.0 (29.6) 23.2 (23.0)
Final fine 71.9 (201.6) 246.7 (309.1)*** 17.9 (28.1) 17.9 (22.0)
Average percentage reduction by leniency 0.0 (0.0) 0.3 (0.2)*** 0.0 (0.0) 0.5 (0.3)***
Final fine per firm 15.3 (64.5) 23.4 (34.6) 2.1 (3.4) 1.5 (1.7)
Final fine per consolidated firm 21.3 (96.9) 40.5 (53.8) 2.4 (3.9) 2.6 (3.4)
Max cartel duration (years) 8.0 (6.6) 7.8 (6.2) 6.8 (6.8) 11.0 (9.2)*
Duration of investigation 3.9 (1.9) 4.3 (1.6) 2.7 (1.0) 2.3 (0.4)
Average number of firms 11.1 (11.0) 12.4 (9.8) 14.2 (13.5) 11.1 (7.5)
Average number of consolidated firms 10.2 (10.1) 6.6 (3.7)*** 12.7 (11.9) 7.6 (5.1)*
Average number of countries 5.0 (4.4) 5.1 (2.7) 1.2 (0.6) 2.5 (1.8)***
Average number of countries (parent firms) 5.1 (4.5) 4.1 (2.1) 1.2 (0.6) 2.4 (1.7)***
Begins by Leniency 0.0 (0.0) 0.7 (0.5)*** 0.0 (0.0) 0.8 (0.4)***
Begins Commission Initiative 0.7 (0.5) 0.2 (0.4)*** 0.5 (0.5) 0.2 (0.4)**
Begins Notification 0.1 (0.2) 0.0 (0.0)** 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0)
Cartel Stability 0.7 (0.5) 0.2 (0.4)*** 0.4 (0.5) 0.1 (0.3)**
Note 1: Numbers expressed in million edeflated on the basis of year 2010 (WB Prices database). Standard deviation
within brackets. Cases with sanctions only to firm associations (not individual firm sanctions) excluded: 7 cases out of 129
excluded in the EU, and 7 cases out of 67 excluded in Spain.
Note 2: *, ** and *** indicates that mean t-tests between categories shows statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.
Source: Authors’ elaboration from the publicly available case files.
Table 1 shows that the average reduction in fines4 is 30% in the EC cases, while it is as large
as 50% in the Spanish cases. The number of cartels cases that begin with a leniency application
is as large as 70% since the introduction of the leniency program in the EU, while it is as large
as 80% since the introduction of the Spanish leniency program.
Table 1 also shows that there are some significant mean differences across the no leniency/leniency
split in each jurisdiction. In the EC leniency cases, basic amount of fines and final fines are much
larger. However, there is not such significant difference if we look at the final fines per firm.
Additionally, there has been a significant reduction in the number of consolidated firms.
In the Spanish leniency cases, there are not significant differences in the amount of fines.
There has been as in the EU, a significant reduction in the number of consolidated firm fined,
but a significant increase in the number of different countries in which cartel participants are
registered.
These changes might stem from changes in the type of cartels discovered and fined since the
leniency program is approved and used, but the leniency program may not have caused those
changes. We need an identification strategy that allows us to separate and quantify the causal
effect of the leniency program.
Additionally, the EU leniency program has suffered a couple of reforms in 2002 and 2006
4Monetary values are deflated on the basis of the year 2010 (World Bank prices database).
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since it was created in 1996. We can then look at the mean differences in cartel profiles using
the split of the different EC leniency programs.
Table 2 shows that there has been since 2002 a significant increase in the amount of fines
reaching 52,5 million euros per consolidated firm. The number of firms and the number of coun-
tries also increase since 2002. And the number of cases that begin with leniency applications is
always increasing reaching a 90% in 2006.
Table 3.2: Average statistics by EU Leniency Programs.





Number of cases (all) 40 39 29 21
Number of cases (associations only excluded) 33 39 29 21
Basic amount of fines 117.3 -291.9 242.2 -287.2 440.3 (428.1)** 341.8 -318
Fines before leniency 14.8 -17.8 249 -351.9 503.4 (492.8)** 245.5 -197.3
Final fine 71.9 -201.6 157.4 (190.1)* 344.2 (350.4)*** 277.7 -386.6
Average percentage reduction by leniency 0 0 0.3 (0.2)*** 0.3 -0.1 0.4 (0.2)***
Final fine per firm 15.3 -64.5 20 -25.5 21.3 -21.6 32.7 -57
Final fine per consolidated firm 21.3 -96.9 25.2 -27.2 52.5 (63.8)** 52.2 -69.5
Max cartel duration (years) 8 -6.6 8.8 -6 8.2 -7.2 5.5 -4.7
Duration of investigation 3.9 -1.9 4.3 -1.7 4.7 -1.5 3.7 (1.1)**
Average number of firms 11.1 -11 9.1 -6 17 (12.2)*** 12.4 -9.6
Average number of consolidated firms 10.2 -10.1 6.6 (3.6)** 7.2 -3.9 5.7 -3.9
Average number of countries 5 -4.4 4.2 -2.5 6.4 (2.5)*** 5 (2.9)*
Average number of countries (parent firms) 5.1 -4.5 3.8 -2 4.8 (2.3)* 3.6 (1.6)**
Begins by Leniency 0 0 0.5 (0.5)*** 0.7 (0.5)* 0.9 -0.3
Begins Commission Initiative 0.7 -0.5 0.3 (0.5)*** 0.2 -0.4 0.1 -0.3
Begins Notification 0.1 -0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cartel Stability 0.7 -0.5 0.3 (0.4)*** 0.2 -0.4 0.3 -0.5
Note 1: Numbers expressed in million edeflated on the basis of year 2010 (WB Prices database). Standard deviation
within brackets. Cases with sanctions only to firm associations (not individual firm sanctions) excluded: 7 cases out of 129
excluded in the EU, and 7 cases out of 67 excluded in Spain.
Note 2: *, ** and *** indicates that mean t-tests between categories shows statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.
Note 3: Mean t-tests compare leniency 1996 cartels with no leniency cartels, leniency 2002 cartels with respect leniency 1996
cartels, and leniency 2006 cartels with respect leniency 2002 cartels.
Source: Authors’ elaboration from the publicly available case files.
3.3.1 The Identification of the Leniency Program Effect
We are interested in studying the effect of the Leniency Program on cartel duration, fines and
years of investigation. For this purpose, we are going to compare the cartel cases affected by this
regulation with the cartel cases not affected by the Leniency Program. Our main identification
source comes from the fact that the date of implementation of the program is exogenous, and
that it has been implemented in the different geographic areas at distinct periods of time. We use
a difference-in-difference approach in which we compare the cartel cases in the treatment group
to those in the control group, both groups being composed of European and Spanish cartel cases.
However, we need to be more specific about our sample of interest given that it is not as sim-
ple as having a treated and a control group. There are three particular issues. First of all, cartel
members can apply for Leniency Program, but they could also benefit from a lenient treatment
if they cooperate with the authority even if the discovery is not due to the Leniency Program.
76
Secondly, the previous situation can take place even if the legislation was passed after the death
of the cartel. Finally, we need to make an additional distinction apart from being treated by
the program or not: some cartels were alive before the implementation of the Leniency Program
and died after (partial treatment) and some others were born and broken under the existence of
the program (full treatment).
The figure below summarizes all the possible cases5. Note that by aware of leniency we mean
whether the cartel died before the Leniency Program was implemented (not aware) or died after
(aware).

































Source: Authors elaboration from the publicly available case files.
Those cartel cases that were not aware of leniency, did not apply for leniency and did not
cooperate are our control group (in light blue). These cartels were born and died before 1996
for the European cases, and before 2008 for the Spanish cases. The control group is not affected
by the treatment in any sense: they did not know abut the existence of the Leniency Program
while they were alive, and they did not benefit from it afterwards either.
Our treatment group will be different, depending on the outcome of interest. When studying
the effect of the Leniency Program on cartel duration, our first treatment group will be those
cartel cases that were discovered due to application to the program (highlighted in green). The
second treatment group will consider all the cases aware of the leniency program (those marked
5The division of European and Spanish cases is specified in brackets. The first figure corresponds to EU and
the second one to Spain.
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in orange, green and purple).
The reason for this distinction is the following: when studying cartel duration we are firstly
interested in those cases that broke up explicitly because of the program, meaning, those that
applied for leniency. This will give us the comparison between those cartel cases that made
direct use of the program and the control group (highlighted in blue). Additionally, we are also
interested in studying the effect of the existence of the program on the duration of all cartel
cases discovered. Even if the members of the cartel did not apply for a lenient treatment, the
implementation of the program could have some deterrence effect (maybe new cartels formed
are shorter), and in that case the treatment group of interest are all the cases affected by the
existence of the program.
When analyzing the effect of the policy on fines and the duration of the investigation, our
treatment group is composed by those cases that were aware of leniency and either applied for
leniency or cooperated with the authority (highlighted in orange and green).
On the other hand, those cartel cases that died before the program was implemented but
either applied for leniency or cooperated with the authority are excluded from our sample (they
should be in the control group but benefited from a lenient treatment).
As mentioned above, there is a second distinction we make in our treatment group. These
cartel cases died after the Leniency Program was implemented either in Europe or in Spain. The
classification comes from the date of formation: if the cartel was born before the implementation
date (and died after), we consider this observation had a partial treatment. On the other hand,
if the cartel both was formed and died after the program had entered then it had full treatment.
Table 3.3: Classification of Partial and Full Treatment.
Control Partial Treatment Full Treatment
Born Died Born Died Born Died
(Before) (Before) (Before) (In/After) (In/After) (In/After)
Leniency EU 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996
Leniency EU 2002 1996 1996 2002 2002 2002 2002
Leniency EU 2006 1996 1996 2006 2006 2006 2006
Leniency Spain 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008
It should be clarified that these treatment variables corresponding to EU overlap. The reason
is that since Leniency EU 1996 considers all those cartel cases born and dead after 1996 (full
treatment), it also includes those cases affected by the programs implemented afterwards. With
respect to partial treatment we could also have a similar case: for instance, two different cartel
cases may have been formed in 1994 but one could have died in 1999 and the other one in 2004.
Thus, the effects obtained refer to the total effect of the Leniency Program form that moment
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onwards, and not to the effect of the program implemented in a given year.
3.3.2 Methodology
Our first effect of interest is the impact of the Leniency Program on cartel duration. We
compare the duration of the cartels in the treatment group against those in the control group.
A limitation of working with cartel cases is that we can only work with discovered cartels, and
results may not be inferred to the whole population. Harrington and Wei (2017) give the condi-
tions under which the duration of detected cartel would be an unbiased measure of the duration
of the cartel population.
Moreover, Harrington and Chang (2009) develop a model of cartel creation and dissolution
that allows inferring the impact of the competition policy on the population of cartels by measur-
ing the impact on the duration of discovered cartels. According to their model, if the probability
of discovering and convicting cartel members increases due to a change in the policy, then the
least stable cartels collapse immediately. Thus, the surviving cartels have longer durations this
turns into a rise in average duration of discovered cartels in the short run. In the long run,
average duration of observed cartels could go up or down, since less stable cartels do not form in
first place (rise in duration) but the formerly stable cartels break up earlier (decrease in duration).
We distinguish between the short run and long run impact of the Leniency Program on cartel
duration in the sense of those cartels that were formed before the implementation of the policy
and died after (partial treatment or short run effect) versus those cases that were formed under
the existence of the Leniency Program (full treatment or long run effect).
For our purpose, we estimate the Cox proportional hazard model for survival analysis6. The
purpose of the model is to examine how specified factors influence the rate of a particular event
happening. In this case, the event is cartel death. The Cox proportional hazard model assumes
that the effects of the predictor variables upon survival are constant over time and are additive.
If the coefficient is positive, or equivalently the hazard ratio is greater than one (exponential of
the coefficient), it indicates that as the value of the covariate increases, the event hazard increases
and thus the length of survival decreases. In other words, a hazard ratio above one indicates
that it is positively associated with the event probability, and thus, negatively associated with
the length of survival.
6Brenner (2009), De (2010) and Zhou (2015) also use this methodology, with the main difference that we
study the cases of EU and Spain, which allows for a diff-in-diff approach (the comparison group is not only the
previous cases of the corresponding geographic area but also the ones in the other region, and the treated group
receives the treatment in different periods of time).
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The regression estimated is the following one:
hi(t) = h0(t)exp(β1treatedi + β2spaini + β3lncountryi + β4lnfirmi + β5stabilityi + εt + ηs + ui) (3.1)
where: treatmenti is a binary variable that either denotes partial treatment or full treatment and
takes value 1 in the cartel case was affected by the corresponding Leniency Program, depending
on the regression; spaini is a binary variable that takes value 1 for Spanish cases; lncountryi is
the logarithm of the number of countries to which belong the firms of the cartel case; lnfirmi
is the logarithm of the number of firms involved in the cartel case; stabilityi is a binary variable
that takes value 1 if all firms entered and exited the cartel at the same time; ε denotes time
fixed effects; η denotes industry fixed effects.
The time fixed effects correspond to two dummy variables: one of them takes value 1 if the
year of the decision is between 1996 and 2007 (both inclusive) and the other one takes value
1 if the year of the decision is after 2007. These variables control for any possible effects that
happened in those periods either in Spain or in the European Union. A dummy variable for
each year cannot be used because the number of observations is not big enough. The industries
fixed effects are a dummy variable for each sector of the NACE Rev.2 classification.
We estimate two different specifications of this model. In the first one, shown in the results
section, the treatment variable takes value one if the cartel case was either partially or fully
affected by any of the corresponding Leniency Programs. This will give us the average overall
effect of the Leniency Program in EU and Spain. Thus, when it refers to partial treatments, it
takes value one for all the cases that were born before the implementation of any of the programs
(EU96, EU02, EU06 or SP08) and that died after. Similarly, when we study the full treatment
the variable takes value one for all the cases that were formed and died after having passed the
each policy.
The second specification studies each of the European Leniency Programs in a separate re-
gression, but the Spanish Leniency Program is included in all regressions. For instance, the
variable partial treatment for the EU96 & SP08 programs will take value one for those European
cases formed before 1996 and died after that year, and those Spanish cases formed before 2008
and broken later on. Note that, as explained above, there exist some cases that can be classified
either as partial or full.
Additionally, we are interested in studying the effect of the Leniency Program on the ba-
sic and final fines imposed to the discovered cartels, and on the duration of the investigation.
Following Brenner (2009), if more information is disclosed due to the cooperation with the au-
thority, then the basic fine (fine prior to the application of the leniency scheme) should be larger
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than the basic fines imposed before the existence of the Leniency Program. The effect on the
final fines of the treated group could be either positive or negative, depending on the reduction.
However, the author finds that the fine reductions do not fully compensate for the increase of
basic fines. With respect to the duration of the investigation, it should decrease given that the
costs of obtaining relevant information are lower. We should also consider that the information
disclosed could make the analysis of the case more complex.
The regression estimated, by OLS, is the following one:
yi = β0 + β1treatmenti + β2spaini + β3lncountryi + β4lnfirmi + β5durationi + εt + ηs + ui) (3.2)
where: y is the logarithm of the outcome of interest (basic fine, final fine or years of investiga-
tion); ldurationi is the logarithm of the maximum duration of the cartel; and the rest of the
variables are defined as above. Also in this case, two different specifications of each regression
are considered.
An important methodological issue arises at this point. In order to study cartel fines, we
have to control for cartel duration, since it is relevant to determine the fine imposed by the
authority. However, our first regression of interest measures whether the Leniency Program had
any impact on cartel duration. Therefore, the variables duration and treatment will be collinear
in this model. More importantly, the Leniency Program could have an impact on fines either di-
rectly, or indirectly through cartel duration, or both. For now, we work with the simplest model
specification (standard OLS), assuming that the LP has a direct effect on fines and controlling
for cartel duration (the coefficient of this variable may be biased), and will leave this problem
for future versions of this paper. This possible distinction between the direct and indirect effect
of the program on cartel fines has not been considered in the literature as far as we know.
3.4 Results
In this section we present the results of the Cox regression for cartel duration, and the results
for basic fines, final fines and years of investigation. In particular, we show the specification in
which all Leniency Programs are summarized in one variable. Results for each program sepa-
rately can be found in the appendix.
Table 4 presents the results (expressed as hazard ratio) for the Cox regression estimation.
Results show that those cartel cases that were partially treated by the Leniency Program and
applied for the program, experiment a 69% decrease in the hazard of failure (model (2)). This
means that the duration of these cartel cases is higher than those in the control group. When all
cartels partially treated are considered, meaning all the cartel cases affected by the existence of
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the program, had they applied for the program or not, the decrease in the probability of dying is
66% (model (6)). The cases considered in these two samples are those that the implementation
of the policy took them by surprise. Thus, results show a short-run effect (partial treatment) of
Leniency Program: the detected cartels have longer duration than the ones in the control group
(hazard ratio lower than one). This result is consistent with the one of Harrington and Chang
(2009) and Zhou (2015). These authors conclude that the average duration of discovered cartels
rises in the short run in response to a more effective competition policy. The reason is that if
the policy is efficacious, then its adoption will immediately cause the marginally stable cartels
to collapse and they will exit the cartel population, which means that they cannot be discovered.
Table 3.4: Cartel Duration (Cox regression) Hazard Ratio. All Leniency Programs
(EU96, EU02, EU06 & SP08
Variables Partial Treatment Full Treatment Partial Treatment Full Treatment(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment 0.87 0.31*** 3.20*** 10.07 0.87 0.34** 4.03*** 10.58***(0.16) (0.14) (0.96) (21.09) (0.13) (0.18) (1.01) (8.76)
Log N. Countries 0.68*** 0.66*** 0.87 0.82 0.75*** 0.72*** 0.97 0.98(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.15) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.16)
Log N. Firms 1.32** 1.17 1.08 1.01 1.22* 1.17 1.07 0.92(0.16) (0.29) (0.13) (0.20) (0.14) (0.22) (0.19) (0.17)
Stability 1.74*** 1.42 2.52*** 2.33 2.05*** 1.80*** 2.15*** 2.12*(0.31) (0.34) (0.83) (1.32) (0.33) (0.35) (0.58) (0.86)
After fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Spain fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 106 106 77 77 143 143 100 100







for LP All All All All
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The coefficient of interest (the one of the treatment variable) is not significant for the sample
of cartel cases that apply for Leniency Program when we include year and sector fixed effects.
However, the result is significant when we consider all the cartel cases born under the Leniency
Program. The hazard ratio can be interpreted as follows: the probability of dying of those
cartels born and dead under the Leniency Program is around ten times higher than the one of
the cartels in the control group. Therefore, the duration of the treated cases is lower than the
duration of the cartels born and dead before the implementation of the program. Harrington
and Chang (2009) find that the effect of the Leniency Program on cartel duration in the long
run is ambiguous, it could go either up or down. On the one hand, those cartels at the margin
that are less stable will not form under this policy, which entails a rise in the observed durations.
On the other hand, the formerly stable long-running cartels break up earlier, reducing observed
cartels durations. Our results are consistent with the second explanation: the long run effect of
the Leniency Program is a decrease in cartels duration.
A pending question would be whether the Leniency Program brings shorter or less stable
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cartels to light or whether it does really deter collusion by means of the formation of shorter
cartels or the formation of fewer cartels. Harrington and Chang (2009) claim that in response
to a policy that alters the likelihood of detection and conviction, the effect of the rate of cartels
can be inferred by observing the duration of discovered cartels in the short run. If average
cartel duration goes up, then the policy has caused the probability that firms are discovered and
convicted to rise and thus we can conclude that it will result in fewer cartels forming in the new
steady state. Our results prove this last point.
On the other hand, we find no significant effect of the Leniency Program on basic fines nor
on final fines when we control for time fixed effects. These results should be interpreted care-
fully, since we have to either improve our estimation specification or explain in detail why this
specification would be the right one despite the issues commented above.
For now, two reasons could explain these provisional results. Firstly, given that the descrip-
tive statistics show that fines are high for those cartel cases that benefited from the Leniency
Program but the treatment variable of interest is not significant, it could be that the authority
adopted a stronger position in the fight against collusion during the whole period, and not nec-
essarily only through the program. An alternative explanation could be that there is no direct
effect of the Leniency Program on fines, but it has an indirect through cartel duration given that
the coefficient of the variable duration is positive and significant, and we have shown previously
the effect on the policy on cartel duration.
Table 3.5: Log of Basic Fines (Deflated). All Leniency Programs (EU96, EU02, EU06
& SP08).
Variables Partial Treatment Full Treatment Both Treatments(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 2.09*** 0.68 2.81*** 1.32 2.01*** 0.79(0.56) (0.83) (0.43) (0.85) (0.59) (0.96)
Log N. Countries 0.13 0.58** 0.11 0.38 0.18 0.51***(0.22) (0.15) (0.50) (0.62) (0.23) (0.14)
Log N. Firms 0.37 0.33* 0.18 0.04 0.29 0.21(0.23) (0.18) (0.23) (0.23) (0.20) (0.17)
Log Duration 0.52** 0.39*** 0.83*** 0.62*** 0.57*** 0.47***(0.23) (0.10) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.09)
After fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Spain fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 99 99 55 55 109 109




















Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.6: Log of Final Fines (Deflated). All Leniency Programs (EU96, EU02, EU06
& SP08).
Variables Partial Treatment Full Treatment Both Treatments(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 2.12*** 0.32 2.79*** 1.54 2.11*** 0.49(0.27) (0.84) (0.29) (0.95) (0.27) (0.93)
Log N. Countries 0.43** 0.62*** 0.57 0.72** 0.48** 0.66***(0.18) (0.16) (0.32) (0.22) (0.17) (0.13)
Log N. Firms 0.44** 0.40*** 0.22 0.24* 0.40** 0.36**(0.17) (0.12) (0.17) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12)
Log Duration 0.32 0.20* 0.57*** 0.43*** 0.33* 0.28**(0.23) (0.10) (0.17) (0.09) (0.18) (0.10)
After fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Spain fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 127 127 86 86 143 143




















Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Finally, we find a significant and negative effect of the treatment on the duration of the in-
vestigation. The Leniency Program decreases the duration of investigation (measured in years),
of those cartel cases that apply for Leniency Program or cooperate with the authority, around
23%-35%. Given that the average years of investigation is 3.66 years for the observations in the
control group, this means a reduction about 0.8-1.3 years.
Table 3.7: Log Years of Investigation. All Leniency Programs (EU96, EU02, EU06 &
SP08).
Variables Partial Treatment Full Treatment Both Treatments(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment -0.01 -0.32** 0.05 -0.23* -0.03 -0.35***(0.07) (0.14) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.11)
Log N. Countries 0.13 0.16* 0.11 0.18*** 0.11 0.15*(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08)
Log N. Firms 0.06** 0.04 0.07** 0.05 0.07*** 0.05*(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Log Duration -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
After fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Spain fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 127 127 86 86 143 143




















Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper aims at identifying and quantifying the effect on the Leniency Program on cartel
duration, cartel fines and the duration of the investigation. In particular, we study the effect of
the Leniency Program implemented in EU in 1996, and modified later on in 2002 and 2006; and
the one implemented in Spain in 2008. The exogeneity of the date of introduction and the fact
that it was implemented in the two geographical areas at different moments of time allow us to
identify the effect of interest, using a difference-in-difference approach.
Our dataset contains all the cartel cases discovered by the European Commission and the
Spanish Competition Authority since 1980 and 1990, respectively, until 2015. There are, in total,
196 cases, out of which 129 belong to the EU and 67 to Spain. We exclude from our analysis
those cases that involve only business associations but not actual firms.
In order to study the impact on the program on cartel duration, we use the Cox proportional
hazard model. The treatment groups of interest in this case are two: those cartel cases that
applied for the Leniency Program on the one hand (the discovery is a direct consequence of the
program); and all of the cases broken after the implementation of the program (we distinguish
between those that were formed before the existence of the program, and those that were born
after). To analyze the effect on fines and the duration of the investigation, we estimate an OLS
model where the variable of interest is the diff-in-diff. For this second part, the sample of interest
is those cartel cases that benefited from the lenient treatment or fine reduction: either applied
for the program or cooperated with the authority.
Our results show a short-run effect of the Leniency Program: the detected cartels that were
partially affected have a longer duration than the ones in the control group. In particular, they
experiment a 66%-69% decrease in the hazard of failure with respect to the control group. In
the long run, the program decreases cartel duration: the probability of dying of those cartels
born and dead under the Leniency Program is around ten times higher than the one of the
cartels in the control group. These results are consistent with the theoretical ones proposed by
Harrington and Chang (2009). They find that in response to a policy that alters the likelihood
of detection and conviction, the effect of the rate of cartels can be inferred by observing the
duration of discovered cartels in the short run. If average cartel duration goes up, then the
policy has caused the probability that firms are discovered and convicted to rise and thus we
can conclude that it will result in fewer cartels forming in the new steady state.
On the other hand, no significant effect is found on fines. It could be that the fines are higher
during that period because the authority took a stronger position in the fight against cartels but
this position it not necessarily taken through the program. Or it may be because the Leniency
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Program has an indirect effect on fines through cartel duration, and not a direct one. How-
ever, these results should be interpreted carefully for now. Finally, we find that the duration of
the investigation decreases significantly around 0.8-1.3 years, as previous studies in the literature.
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Appendix 3.A Description of Variables
From the publicly available case files, we have computed the following information. Monetary
values are deflated on the basis of the year 2010 (World Bank prices database):
i Basic amount of finesi (euro): it is the total basic amount of fines of the case i before leniency
application. This information is not always available in the publicly available case files, which
implies we have a smaller number of observations than number of cartel decisions.
ii Final finei: the sum of fines imposed on all the undertakings involved in the cartel case
i. It differs from the basic amount of fine because in the final fine it is taken into account
aggravating and/or attenuation circumstances that increase or reduce the final fine with
respect to the basic amount of fine. The data is offered before and after leniency.
iii Average percentage of leniency reductioni: average of the percentage reductions granted to
leniency applicants per case in the final fine.
iv Final fine per firmi: the ratio between the final official fine and the total number of firms
participating in the cartel i.
v Final fine per consolidated firmi: the ratio between the final official fine and the total number
of firms participating in the cartel i. All the subsidiaries and the parent company belonging
to the same consolidated group (holdings) are counted only once
vi Maximum durationi: maximum number of years the cartel i was functioning according to
the final decision.
vii Duration of the investigationi: the number of years between the starting date of the Com-
mission’s investigation and the date of its final decision in each cartel case.
viii Average number of firmsi: it is the average number of firms that participate in the cartel
during its existence.
ix Average number of consolidated firmsi: this is the number of cartel participants but all the
subsidiaries and the parent company belonging to the same consolidated group (holdings)
are counted only once.
x Number of countriesi: this is the number of different countries from which cartel participants
belonged to. Each company is assigned to the country where it has its registered head office.
xi Number of countries (parents)i: this variable is similar to the previous one but discounting
the effect of parent and subsidiaries, where they exist. We account for only one country in
which the parent firm has its head office.
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xii Stabilityi: binary variable that takes value 1 when there was no entry or exit of cartel’s
members throughout the life of the cartel.
xiii Case stems from ...i: binary variables which take value 1 for each way a case i starts with:
a leniency application from one cartelist (post-1996 leniency notice), a notification (in the
pre-2004 authorization regime), a Commission’s own-initiative investigation (ex officio), or
a Commission’s investigation following a third-party complaint.
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Appendix 3.B Additional Results
3.B.1 Cartel Duration by Leniency Program
Table 3.B.1: Cartel Duration (Cox regression) Hazard Ratio by Leniency Program.
Variables Partial Treatment Full Treatment Partial Treatment Full Treatment(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LP 1996 (& 2008) 0.66** 0.28*** 3.20*** 10.07 0.70* 0.44 4.03*** 10.58***(0.13) (0.13) (0.96) (21.09) (0.13) (0.24) (1.01) (8.76)
Obs 86 86 77 77 118 118 100 100
Pseudo R2 0.031 0.067 0.037 0.044 0.027 0.054 0.045 0.083
LP 2002 (& 2008) 0.89 0.39** 4.58*** 9.53 0.83 0.39** 6.13*** 18.78**(0.19) (0.18) (1.45) (17.27) (0.15) (0.17) (1.52) (26.34)
Obs 81 81 61 61 107 107 77 77
Pseudo R2 0.024 0.060 0.047 0.086 0.027 0.051 0.069 0.108
LP 2006 (& 2008) 1.04 0.47 12.36*** 11.65 0.95 0.51 13.84*** 20.48**(0.22) (0.28) (7.02) (17.70) (0.19) (0.26) (6.04) (28.83)
Obs 73 73 52 52 90 90 65 65
Pseudo R2 0.015 0.057 0.060 0.108 0.020 0.058 0.093 0.136
After fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes







for LP All All All All
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
3.B.2 Basic Fines by Leniency Program
Table 3.B.2: Log of Basic Fines (Deflated) by Leniency Program.
Variables Partial Treatment Full Treatment Both Treatments(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LP 1996 (& 2008) 1.83** 0.76 2.81*** 1.32 2.01*** 0.79(0.58) (0.77) (0.43) (0.85) (0.59) (0.96)
Obs 83 83 55 55 109 109
R2 0.657 0.736 0.649 0.718 0.620 0.684
LP 2002 (& 2008) 2.18*** 1.08 2.75*** 0.47 2.17*** 1.03(0.53) (0.93) (0.44) (0.75) (0.55) (1.00)
Obs 68 68 37 37 76 76
R2 0.667 0.762 0.555 0.697 0.661 0.748
LP 2006 (& 2008) 1.84** 0.26 1.23 -0.06 1.73** 0.24(0.58) (0.88) (0.83) (0.88) (0.59) (0.84)
Obs 50 50 32 32 53 53
R2 0.527 0.661 0.426 0.604 0.518 0.633
After fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes




















Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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3.B.3 Final Fines by Leniency Program
Table 3.B.3: Log of Final Fines (Deflated) by Leniency Program.
Variables Partial Treatment Full Treatment Both Treatments(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LP 1996 (& 2008) 1.79*** 0.32 2.79*** 1.54 2.11*** 0.49(0.28) (0.83) (0.29) (0.95) (0.27) (0.93)
Obs 103 103 86 86 143 143
R2 0.540 0.630 0.579 0.665 0.543 0.627
LP 2002 (& 2008) 2.23*** 0.57 2.63*** 1.18 2.252*** 0.783(0.34) (0.92) (0.53) (0.69) (0.25) (0.89)
Obs 91 91 65 65 110 110
R2 0.596 0.712 0.475 0.607 0.589 0.699
LP 2006 (& 2008) 2.00*** 0.06 2.21* 0.25 2.02*** -0.02(0.37) (0.58) (1.02) (0.60) (0.37) (0.62)
Obs 76 76 53 53 83 83
R2 0.476 0.621 0.346 0.518 0.481 0.612
After fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes




















Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
3.B.4 Duration of Investigation by Leniency Program
Table 3.B.4: Log Years of Investigation by Leniency Program.
Variables Partial Treatment Full Treatment Both Treatments(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LP 1996 (& 2008) -0.05 -0.36* 0.05 -0.23* -0.03 -0.35***(0.08) (0.18) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.11)
Obs 103 103 86 86 143 143
R2 0.201 0.326 0.123 0.278 0.188 0.188
LP 2002 (& 2008) 0.06 -0.40*** -0.14* -0.50*** -0.02 -0.36***(0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.010) (0.08) (0.04)
Obs 91 91 65 65 110 110
R2 0.243 0.423 0.156 0.339 0.219 0.372
LP 2006 (& 2008) -0.13** -0.53*** -0.24 -0.41** -0.15** -0.46***(0.06) (0.05) (0.14) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06)
Obs 76 76 53 53 83 83
R2 0.197 0.435 0.199 0.371 0.221 0.409
After fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes




















Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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